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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Larry Kudlow, former economic advisor to President Ronald
Reagan, lauded new economic proposals from President George W. Bush as
"another dose of cowboy capitalism." The term "cowboy capitalism" was
first used as a derogatory epithet by liberal domestic and European critics of
Ronald Reagan's efforts to rollback nearly fifty years of welfare-state poli-
cies. The term has since been embraced by advocates of low tax rates, de-
regulation, and free trade. According to Kudlow, Bush's economic propos-
als reflect "market-oriented measures" that are "pro-growth, incentive-
based, and investor-and owner-oriented," and "clearly [reject] government
planning and entitlement."'
The ranching industry that produced the cowboy, however, has long had
a heavy dose of government planning and welfare state subsidies, especially
in public lands grazing. Some have even referred to it as cowboy socialism,
* Professor of Political Science at University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown.
1. Larry Kudlow, Bush's Clear Economic Message: The President Nailed it During his Two-day
Economic Conference, National Review Online, http://www.nationalreview.com/kudlow/kudlow2004-
12211029.asp (last accessed Dec. 21, 2004).
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calling public lands ranching "an industry owned and operated by the U. S.
Government."2
As the governor of Texas, home of the cowboy and cradle of the ranch-
ing industry, George Bush ran for President in 2000 as a cowboy capitalist.
When he was sworn in as President in 2001, he had opportunities to ad-
vance cowboy capitalist principles by rolling back welfare state practices in
public lands ranching and, in the process, to move forward on some of his
campaign pledges to improve the health of the environment.
For six years, the Bush Administration headed up some public lands pol-
icy trails and left others not taken. President Bush appointed important land
management personnel, proposed budgets and regulatory changes, issued
strategic plans and environmental impact statements, and litigated issues in
Court. After almost two terms, the Administration has established a record
that can help answer the question: when cowboy capitalist ideology met the
welfare ranching reality, how did each fare?
II. GEORGE W. BUSH AS COWBOY CAPITALIST
Ronald Reagan spent almost two decades condemning the modern wel-
fare state before he was elected President in 1980. In the speech that
brought him national prominence in 1964 he said, "a government can't con-
trol the economy without controlling people.... [W]hen a government sets
out to do that, it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose....
[O]utside of its legitimate functions, government does nothing as well or as
economically as the private sector of the economy. 3 Seventeen years later,
in his first inaugural address as President, he said, "[ilt is no coincidence
that our present troubles parallel and are proportionate to the intervention
and intrusion in our lives that result from unnecessary and excessive growth
of government.... In this present crisis, government is not the solution to
our problem, government is the problem."4 His first acts as President in-
cluded freezing all hiring of federal employees, slashing government regu-
lation of the oil and gas industry, and pushing massive cuts in spending on
government welfare programs.
Reagan nurtured his image as a cowboy, campaigning in cowboy hat and
boots, and riding his horse at "the ranch."5 Critics that saw his economic
2. Karl Hess, Jr., Enviro-Socialism, The American Enterprise Institute Magazine Online,
http://www.taemag.comlissues/articleID. 16498/article.detail.asp (last accessed July-Aug. 1995).
3. Ronald Reagan, Televised Address, Address on behalf of Barry Goldwater: Rendezvous with
Destiny (Oct. 27, 1964) (available at http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reaganIspeeches/rendez-
vous.asp).
4. Ronald Reagan, Address, Inaugural Address (U.S. Capitol, Jan. 20, 1981) (available at
http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/first.asp).
5. The famous 1980 "Reagan Country" campaign photo of Reagan in a cowboy hat is still avail-
able for purchase at www.reaganfoundation.org/store/products.asp?subcat-id= 10. At the Reagan Ranch
today, "Ihe living room contains paintings of cowboys and Western landscapes . . . [tihe Reagans'
branding iron hangs on a wall ... [t]he master bedroom... closet still holds Reagan's cowboy boots,
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proposals as a serious assault on the consensus institutions built during the
Progressive Era and the New Deal quickly condemned "Reaganomics" as
"cowboy capitalism." Mark Green wrote in 1982, "not only are the factual
premises of Reagan's Cowboy Capitalism faulty, but its theoretical under-
pinning seems pretty speculative .... The nostrums of the 1920s, or even
the 1950s, cannot fit the 1980s. ''6 However, supporters of Reagan's policies
and philosophy have come to embrace the term Cowboy Capitalism. Kud-
low wrote that in 1980 "the U.S. embarked on 'cowboy capitalism'. . . poli-
cies of low tax rates, free trade, price stability and massive entrepreneur-
ship." These policies led to "Schumpeterian gales of creative destruction"
and "the widest profit margins in the world," and "attracted investment in-
flows from the four corners of the globe.",7 More recently, according to
Kudlow, "The American model of 'cowboy capitalism' - of low tax rates,
deregulation, contained inflation, and free trade - is producing unheard of
wealth that is turning the have-nots into haves."8
Olaf Gersemann, in Cowboy Capitalism: European Myths, American Re-
ality, argues that the superior adaptability of "cowboy capitalism" is among
the factors that have contributed to America's "new productivity miracle"
and its greater economic performance than Europe's "comfy capitalism"
model.9 James Glassman paraphrases Keynes in arguing that "cowboy spir-
its" account for greater economic growth and job creation in the United
States than in Europe.10 According to Gersemann, Reagan's cowboy capi-
talism represented "a paradigm shift" from the prior half-century, when the
free market was considered the problem, and government the solution. The
result of this shift was a "sweeping liberalization" of the economy as the
government's influence on the economy was reduced. Specifically, taxes
several hats, and a dozen or so shirts and jackets." Young America's Foundation, The Home,
http://reaganranch.yaf.org/tour/home.cfm. (Last accessed April 1, 2008)
6. Mark Green, Winning Back America 29, 33 (Bantam Books 1982); See also Mark Green,
Reagan's Cowboy Capitalism, The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/doc/19810307/green (Mar. 7,
1981); See e.g. Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Dangerous Pursuits: Mergers and Acquisitions in the
Age of Wall Street (Pantheon Books 1989).
7. Kudlow is referring to the economist Joseph Schumpeter, who explained capitalism's dyna-
mism as a "perennial gale of creative destruction." Schumpeter wrote, "[t]his process of Creative De-
struction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist
concern has got to live in." See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy, 3rd ed, 1950, 85-
86. Larry Kudlow, Saddle Up with the Dollar: Cowboy Capitalism Will Take Care of the Greenback,
National Review Online, http://www.nationalreview.com/kudlow/kudlow2004ll160821.asp (Nov. 16,
2004).
8. Larry Kudlow, Any Hedgehogs Running for President?, National Review Online, http://article.
nationalreview.comrq=MDdiOTg5NDk3OWQ2NzE5YTUzYTMxZjEyZTBjYzJmZTc= (Mar. 13,
2007).
9. Olaf Gersemann, Cowboy Capitalism: European Myths, American Reality 32, 64 (Cato Inst.
2004).
10. Keynes wrote of the "spontaneous optimism" or "spontaneous urge to action" that animates
many economic decisions. He described these as "animal spirits," and Glassman likens them to "cowboy
spirits" in defending cowboy capitalism. See James K. Glassman, Speech, U.S. Lessons for Economic
Growth in Europe, (German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Berlin, Ger., June 6, 2002).
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were lowered, product markets deregulated, public enterprises privatized,
welfare state regulations reduced, and the power of unions diminished."1
In his first State of the Union address in 2001, President Bush declared,
"the growing surplus exists because taxes are too high and Government is
charging more than it needs. The American people have been overcharged,
and on their behalf, I am here asking for a refund .... [Tihe surplus is not
the Government's money; the surplus is the people's money."'
12
Bush's cowboy swagger was no surprise. He had campaigned as a cow-
boy capitalist, although he did not use that term.13 In fact, he explicitly and
repeatedly called himself a "compassionate conservative."' 14 His conserva-
tism was not the zealous anti-statism of some of his more libertarian advi-
sors. He called for a greater federal role in education and the expansion of
Medicare to include a prescription drug benefit for eligible seniors. In that
first State of the Union he said, "[g]overnment has a role, and an important
one." 5 When accepting his party's nomination six months earlier he as-
serted, "[b]ig government is not the answer, but the alternative to bureauc-
racy is not indifference."'
16
Yet, clearly, in his campaign speeches and documents, Bush expressed a
basic commitment to the tenets of cowboy capitalism. In his made-for-
campaign autobiography, A Charge to Keep, he wrote, "[w]e can now say,
without question, that the belief that government could solve people's prob-
lems was wrong and misguided... We must reduce the reach and scope of
the federal government, returning it to its proper, limited role, and push
freedom and responsibility back to the local government, to neighborhoods,
and to individuals."' 7 This message partially shaped the 2000 Republican
Party Platform, which expressly valued "a reduced role for government,
greater personal liberty, economic freedom, reliance on the market and de-
11. Gersemann, supra n. 9, at 43.
12. George W. Bush, Address, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration
Goals (U.S. Capitol, Feb. 27, 2001) (available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.
php?pid=29643).
13. On the back cover of Bush's 2000 campaign autobiography is a picture of a painting by W.H.D
Koerner that hung in Bush's office while he was Texas governor and currently hangs in the Oval Office.
The painting is of men on horseback. Bush writes that in the first few months as governor of Texas he
sent a memo to his staff: "When you come into my office, please take a look at the beautiful painting of
a horseman determinedly charging up what appears to be a steep and rough trail. This is us." George W.
Bush & Karen Hughes, A Charge to Keep 45 (William Morrow 1999). The White House website cur-
rently includes a photo gallery of President Bush in a cowboy hat "clearing brush" at his Crawford
Ranch. The White House, News and Policies, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/
images/20020809-1_ranch3-515h.html (Aug. 9, 2002). The White House also cooperated with the
interesting history of Bush's Prairie Chapel Ranch. The White House, "The Bush Ranch", Cowboys and
Indians Magazine, Dec. 2002 http://www.cowboysindians.com/articles/ archives/1202/bush.html
(March 25, 2008). Supporters have also embraced the cowboy image.
14. See e.g. Alison Mitchell, Bush Draws Campaign Theme From More Than 'the Heart', N.Y.
Times, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/-nyt-bush-draws-campaign_.htm (June 11, 2000).
15. Bush, supra n. 12.
16. George W. Bush, Speech, Nomination Acceptance Speech (First Union Center, Phila., Pa.,
Aug. 3, 2000) (available at http://www.gwu.edu/-action/bush08O300.html).
17. Bush & Hughes, supra n. 13, at 230.
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centralized decision-making... rewarding creativity, hard work, tenacity,
and a willingness to take risks... a steadfast commitment to open markets,
to minimal regulations, and to reducing taxes that snuff out innovation.' ' 8
The Bush campaign asserted, "it's clear that the old left-liberal order of
social policy has collapsed in failure .... [G]overnment must replace anti-
quated laws that restrict opportunity, increase costs, and inhibit innova-
tion. ' 19
In his second debate with Al Gore in 2000 Bush said, "I don't believe in
command and control out of Washington, D.C .... I don't believe, like the
Vice President does, in huge government. I believe in limited govern-
ment., 20 In the third debate he said, "I trust people. I don't trust the federal
government... I don't want the federal government making decisions on
behalf of everybody.' In an interview with CNN in 2000 he said, "I come
from the school of thought that says by reducing marginal rates on the peo-
ple who pay the taxes, you will enhance economic growth. .. . I don't be-
lieve government creates wealth .... But government can create an envi-
ronment in which capital moves freely. 22
Bush was especially critical of the energy and environmental regulations
that he believed undermined economic growth. He called the strict regula-
tion of the oil and gas industries a move toward "European-style socialism,"
writing that "it seemed to me that elite central planners were determining
the course of our nation. 23 His alternative to government planning was free
enterprise: "I believe in the free market, in good times and in bad. Govern-
ment should not try to control the price of a commodity." 24
In 2001, as the new President of a government he did not trust, Bush was
now responsible for a $1.7 trillion annual federal budget, almost 3 million
federal employees, over 800 executive agencies, tens of thousands of regu-
lations, and government entitlement programs large and small.25 In the
West, he faced a century-old tradition of welfare ranching in which the fed-
18. CNN, Republican Party Platform, 2000, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/conventions/
republican/features/platform.00/.
19. Id.
20. Commssion on Presidential Debates, Debate Transcript: The Second Gore-Bush Presidential
Debate (Oct. 11, 2000) (TV broad., transcr. available at http://www.debates.orglpages/trans2000b-p.
html).
21. Commission on Presidential Debates, Debate Transcript: The Third Gore-Bush Presidential
Debate (Oct. 17, 2000) (TV broad., transcr available at http://www.debates.org/pagestrans2000cpp.
html).
22. Interview by Candy Crowley, CNN with George W. Bush, Pres. of U.S. (Aug. 30, 2000) (TV
broad., transcr available at http://www.transcripts.cnn.com/chatITRANSCRIPTS/0008 /30/mn.0l.html
(accessed March 25,2008).
23. Bush & Hughes, supra n. 13, at 72.
24. /d. at 65.
25. See GPO, Budget of the United States Government: Browse Fiscal Year 2001,
http:lwww.gpoaccess.govlusbudgetlfyOl/browse.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2008); See U.S. Census
Bureau, Federal Government Civilian Employment by State, http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/
02federalstate.txt (December 31, 2002). See La. St. U. .jb., LSU Libraries Federal Agencies Directory,
http://www.lib.lsu.edu/gov/fedgov.html (last updated July 23, 2007).
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eral government had granted ranchers legal entitlement to graze livestock
on public lands.
III. PUBLIC LANDS GRAZING
A. History
The public's lands, owned by the United States government, exceed 600
million acres, or about 28% of the land area of the country, mostly in the
western states.26 The federal government owns more than half the land in
Alaska, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. The United States
first acquired lands from cessions by the original thirteen states. In 1803,
the Louisiana Purchase doubled the land area of the United States, adding
enormous swaths of land between the Mississippi River and the Rocky
Mountains, and from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border. At the end
of the Mexican War in 1848, the United States acquired the vast territory
from Texas to the Pacific that would eventually become California, Nevada,
Utah, most of New Mexico and Arizona, and parts of Colorado and Wyo-
ming. In 1853, with the purchase from Mexico of what is now southern
New Mexico and Arizona, the continental boundaries of the United States
27were complete.
The presumption that these public lands would eventually be granted or
sold to states or private parties prevailed throughout the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, and Congress carried out land grants and sales under various Acts.28
However, in response to political pressures at the turn of the century, Con-
gress set aside millions of acres of public land as national parks, reserves,
monuments, cemeteries, and historical preserves.29 Much of the public land
that was not set aside contained valuable resources like minerals, timber,
forage, recreation, and wildlife habitat, and ranchers were not the only pri-
vate parties that desired access.
Advocates of ranching on public lands argue that the practice has a 400-
year heritage dating to the Spanish missions.30 The raising of livestock on
26. Federal lands amount to about 655 million acres in all 50 states, or about 28% of the lands of
the 50 states. See table at www.blm.gov/natacq/pls99/99pl] -3.pdf.
27. The 1853 Gadsden Purchase. There were earlier cessions, seizures, and purchases of various
lands, as well. See Phillip 0. Foss, Politics and Grass: The Administration of Grazing on the Public
Domain (U. of Wash. Press 1960).
28. The Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-284 (repealed 1976); The 1873 Timber Culture
Act, 17 Stat. 605 (1873); The 1877 Desert Land Act, 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
29. The 1872 Act Establishing Yellowstone National Park, 17 Stat. 32 (1872); The 1891 Forest
Reserve Act, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891); The Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1906).
30. Richard L. Knight, The Ecology of Ranching, in Ranching West of the 100Yh Meridian: Culture,
Ecology, and Economics, pg. 12 (R. L. Knight, W. C. Gilgert, & E. Marston, eds., Island Press (2002);
Marc Stimpert, Counterpoint: Opportunities Lost and Opportunities Gained: Separating Truth From
Myth in the Western Ranching Debate, 36 Envtl. L. 996 (2006).
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the western range began as early as the 1870s. 31 In the quarter century fol-
lowing the Civil War, millions of cattle were moved across the southern
plains and shipped to eastern slaughterhouses and markets. These famous
cattle drives that crossed public lands in Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico
and Colorado fixed the cowboy at the center of Western mythology. Ac-
cording to Donahue, "cattle were a relatively efficient means of capturing a
resource-grass-which would otherwise have gone to waste.,
32
Yet as more of the public domain was granted to homesteaders, cattle-
men clashed with farmers on the "contested plains," and cattle country was
pushed west. 33 Ranchers quickly spread over the open range. In 1860, cat-
tle were still absent from the territories of Colorado, Wyoming, and Mon-
tana. Twenty years later, the census counted 1.8 million. 34 According to
Cronon, "[e]verywhere, from Texas to Saskatchewan, the old buffalo range
became ranchland. Bison gave way to livestock., 35 Steinberg called it "one




"Cattle," according to Cronon, "helped ensure that the short grasses
would continue their dominance of the western plains, and were conse-
quently in some ways a force for stability and continuity in the land-
scape. ''37 However, the "tragedy of the commons" scenario played out fair-
ily quickly.38 Overstocking and overgrazing of the public rangelands led to
deteriorating range health as less productive, invasive species succeeded
native forage plants. The cattle trampled riparian areas, compacted soil, and
disrupted aquatic systems.39 In Arizona, one observer noted in 1891 that the
"range was as bare as slide rock., 40 Stockmen clashed as some attempted to
monopolize public land by fence or by force. According to Stimpert,
31. Debra L. Donahue, The Western Range Revisited: Removing Livestock From Public Lands to
Conserve Native Biodiversity, pg. 12 (U. of Oakl. Press 1999); See Terry G. Jordan, North American
Cattle-Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiation (U. of N.M. Press 1993).
32. Debra Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government, 35 Envtl.
L. 737 (2005).
33. Ernest Osgood Staples, The Day of the Cattlemen, 35-36 (U. of Chi. Press 1957); Elliot West,
The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado, pg. 329 (U. of Kan. Press 1998).
34. Karl Hess, Visions Upon the Land: Man and Nature on the Western Range 58 (Island Press
1992).
35. William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West 220 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1992); See also Andrew C. Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-
1920 (Cambridge U. Press 2000); Edward Everett Dale, The Range Cattle Industry (U. of Oakl. Press
1930); Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains, pp. 239-240 (U. of Neb. Press 1959).
36. Ted Steinberg, Down to Earth: Nature's Role in American History 129 (Oxford U. Press 2002).
37. Cronon, supra n. 35, at 220.
38. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243-1248 (1968). Hardin
argued that a herdsman grazing common property has an incentive to constantly add to the size of his
herd since he receives all the benefits from the sale of each additional animal, but only bears a small cost
of the additional overgrazing. The consequence of each herdsman pursuing his individual interest is the
ruination of the commons by overgrazing.
39. Thomas Fleischner, Ecological Costs of Livestock Grazing in Western North America, 8 Con-
serv. Biology 629, 629-644 (1994); Jerry Holechek et al., Natural Resources: Ecology, Economics, and
Policy 340, 347-348, 357 (Prentice Hall 2000).
40. Hess, supra n. 34, at 58.
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"[flederal homestead and open range policies were a disaster for ranchers
and rangeland alike .... Range wars and rangeland degradation were a
direct consequence of these policies. 'a Yet by the end of the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court affirmed a right, or "implied license," of pri-
vately owned livestock to "run at large over the unenclosed lands of the
United States and to feed upon the grasses. 42 In Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S.
320 (1890), the Supreme Court, citing "the custom of nearly a hundred
years," asserted that the public lands, "especially those in which the native
grasses are adapted to the growth and fattening of domestic animals, shall
be free to the people who seek to use them, where they are left open and
unenclosed, and no act of government forbids this use. 43
At the turn of the century, managers of the forest reserves began issuing
grazing permits to individual stockmen and charging grazing fees. In 1934,
Congress ended open range grazing on the rest of the federal domain, partly
in response to livestock industry lobbying. The Taylor Grazing Act
("TGA") authorized the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") to establish
grazing districts on "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved lands ...
chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops," and to withdraw
these districts from "all forms of entry and settlement." 44 By withdrawing
the lands from entry by homesteaders or other settlers, Congress implied
that these lands were not suitable for cultivation and that grazing on the
lands must be controlled.
The TGA sought to provide for the orderly management of grazing on
public lands while protecting the health of the range, in part by giving pref-
erence for grazing permits to local ranchers that also owned adjacent land
and water. The TGA authorized the Secretary to issue grazing permits in
these districts and to assess a reasonable fee. The permits could not exceed
ten years and were renewable at the discretion of the Secretary. It required
that the initial allocation of grazing permits be based on livestock use in the
five years prior to the enactment of TGA. The Secretary was also author-
ized to make rules to protect the land from "destruction or unnecessary in-
jury," provide for its improvement, and limit the number of stock and the
season of use. Finally, the TGA required the Secretary to "adequately safe-
guard" grazing privileges, although the privileges did not create "any right,
title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.,
45
"[W]ith the passage of the [TGA], Congress created a valuable entitle-
ment designed to protect individual ranchers and the livestock industry as a
41. Stimpert, supra n. 30, at 996.
42. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890). The Court held that because the government had not
barred grazing on public lands it had implied that those lands may be freely grazed. This is not neces-
sarily a grazing "right" but an implied license to graze.
43. Bufordv. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
44. The Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C §§ 315-316 (1934).
45. Id.
[Vol. 29
2008] COWBOY CAPITALISM OR WELFARE RANCHING? 93
whole." 46 Without TGA, local owners did not have exclusive use of the
forage on the public lands and couldn't legally bar nomadic sheepherders or
small ranchers from making use of the forage. However, the Act essentially
codified the status quo-grazing rights would be allocated to local owners
of property and water rights.47 In 1960, Congress required that the agencies
manage national forest lands for "multiple use," with grazing among the
authorized uses.48 In 1976, more than forty years after ending open range
grazing policies, Congress ended the long history of public lands disposal
(except in Alaska), declaring that public lands would be "retained in Fed-
eral ownership," and reiterated that they would be managed on a multiple
use and sustained yield basis through land use plans developed with public
involvement.49 Regarding the range, Congress declared livestock grazing a
"principle or major use," but noted "a substantial amount of the Federal
range land is deteriorating in quality."
Congress also promulgated management objectives that reflected the en-
vironmental concerns of the 1970s.50 The Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act ("FLPMA") asserted that increased federal investment in
range improvements could lead to "betterment of forage conditions with
resulting benefits to wildlife, watershed protection, and livestock produc-
tion.' Congress authorized appropriations for "seeding and reseeding,
fence construction, weed control, water development, and fish and wildlife
habitat enhancement," and exempted these range improvements from re-
quired environmental impact assessments. Finally, FLPMA established a
policy under which the federal government would "receive fair market
value of the use of the public lands and their resources unless otherwise
provided for by statute," and authorized the Secretary to cancel grazing
permits in various circumstances. 52
Two years later, Congress returned to the issue and found that "vast seg-
ments of the public rangelands" remained in "unsatisfactory condition,"
46. Stimpert, supra n. 30, at 509.
47. Christopher M. Klyza, Who Controls Public Lands? Mining, Forestry, and Grazing Policies,
1870-1990, pg. 115 (U. of N.C. Press 1996).
48. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1960). According to
Hays, by the early twentieth century, grazing had become "the primary use of the forests, far more
important than lumbering." Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progres-
sive Movement, 1890-1920 49 (U. of Pitt. Press 1969).
49. The Federal Land Policy Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702(c), (h) (1976) (defining
sustained yield as maintenance into perpetuity of a high-level annual output of renewable resources, and
multiple use management as utilization of the various resources in a balanced and diverse manner to
meet the present and future needs of the American people).
50. Id. at § 1701(a)(8) (requires that public lands be managed to: protect the quality of "air and
atmospheric, water resource, and archaeological values"; where appropriate, "preserve and protect
certain public lands in their natural condition ... [so as to] provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife
and domestic animals; ... provide for outdoor recreation.").
51. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
52. Id. at §§ 1701-1785; See The National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C § 1600 (1976); See
also Joseph Ross, FLPMA Turns 30: The Bureau of Land Management Also Celebrates its 6 (yh Birth-
day, 28 Rangelands 16 (2006).
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produced less than their potential for livestock, recreation, and habitat bene-
fits, and were at high risk of further degradation of soil, water, forage, rec-
reation, and esthetic resources.53 However, Congress continued to favor
scientific management of the range, asserting that the unsatisfactory condi-
tions "can be addressed and corrected by an intensive public rangelands
maintenance, management, and improvement program." 54  The Public
Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 ("PRIA") committed the federal
government to preventing "economic disruption and harm to the western
livestock industry" through improved management, increased appropria-
tions, support for grazing stewardship programs, and a new formula for
calculating grazing fees.5 5 The PRIA continued the national policy of fed-
eral management of grazing districts on public lands, public investment in
maintenance and improvements, and government control over livestock
stocking rates.
In the almost thirty years since the passage of the PRIA, pitched battles
have been fought over how to allocate public land among conflicting users,
regulate ranching activity, and charge ranchers fees for the use of the public
land. The most significant policy reform effort since the PRIA was the
Clinton Administration's "Rangeland Reform 94," spearheaded by Bruce
Babbitt. Prior to his appointment as Clinton's Secretary of the Interior,
Babbitt suggested that the federal government scrap traditional multiple-use
management. Instead, he said, "we must recognize the new reality that the
highest and best, most productive use of western public land will usually be
for public purposes-watershed, wildlife, and recreation. 56  As Secretary
of Interior, Babbitt initially tried to reform the grazing permit system
through the legislative process, by raising fees and creating standards and
incentives for more ecological land management practices.57 Ranching
interests and allies of the ranching industry in Congress, especially from
western states, criticized and resisted the reform proposals, and succeeded
in killing these legislative efforts in the Senate. Babbitt managed to push
the reforms through the administrative process, but only after an arduous
effort to accommodate ranchers.
53. The Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1978).
54. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(4) (1978). "Scientific man-
agement" refers to government mandates and regulations based on the recommendations of government-
employed range biologists and other scientists regarding the appropriate levels of grazing, seeding, and
weed control. An alternative to scientific management is free-market management. For a fuller discus-
sion of "scientific management" of public lands see Robert H. Nelson, "Rethinking Scientific Manage-
ment: Brand-New Alternatives for a Century-Old Agency," in A Vision for the US Forest Service:
Goals for the Next Century, Roger Sedjo, ed. Wash. DC, Resources for the Furture, 2000.
55. Id.
56. Joan Hamilton, Babbitt's Retreat, Sierra, http://findarticles.comp/articles/mi_ml525fis-n4
v79/ai_15518168 (July-Aug. 1994).
57. Scott Nicoll, The Death of Rangeland Reform, 21 J. Envtl. L. & Utig. 47 (2006); Karl N.
Arruda & Christopher Watson, The Rise and Fall of Grazing Reform, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 413
(1997).
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The final rule issued by the Administration, which took effect in August
1995: (1) expanded public participation in rangeland management deci-
sions; (2) gave the United States title to all permanent grazing-related im-
provements constructed on public lands; (3) allowed a permittee to stop
grazing activity on an allotment for up to ten years without giving up the
grazing permit; and (4) established standards (or "fundamentals") of range-
land health to preserve or restore healthy grazing lands.5 The rule also
changed the definition of "grazing preference" to give a permittee priority
for receiving a grazing permit, but not for a specific quantity of forage as
the regulations had previously provided. 59 Finally, the rule clarified the
permit eligibility criteria by eliminating the requirement that a permit
holder be "engaged in the livestock business."
'6
Ranchers and their allies sued the Administration, claiming that the new
grazing rules were inconsistent with the Secretary's statutory obligations. In
Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000), the Supreme Court
ruled unanimously that Babbitt acted within his statutory authority when he
issued the new rules.61 The Administration had not appealed a ruling by the
Tenth Circuit striking down conservation use permits as violating the
TGA.6 2
The battles of the 1990s, however, did not fundamentally alter the estab-
lished policy of giving preference to grazing uses on public land. The fed-
eral government continued to invest in range maintenance and improve-
ments, require permittees to actively graze the allotments, and dictate the
total number of livestock. This policy approach is consistent with other
"command and control" (or standards and enforcement) statutes, under
which government mandates the means by which private businesses meet
government-formulated standards, and imposes penalties upon violations.6 3
It also reflects the Progressive "vision upon the land," which makes re-
source development and allocation decisions based on scientific principles
applied by disinterested experts. According to Karl Hess, the Progressive
multiple-use land management approach is rooted in an almost unlimited
58. 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780,4100 (1995).
59. Compare 43 C.F.R. 4100.0-5 (1995) to 43 C.F.R. 4100.0-5 (1994). The old rules defined graz-
ing preference in terms of a quantity of forage, alowing a rancher to harvest a particular amount of
forage with a specific number of cows. The new rules defined "preference" as having a priority over
other applicants for a permit renewal or for any additional forage on the allotment that might become
available.
60. Compare 42 C.F.R. 4110.1(a) (1995) to 43 C.F.R. 100.1(a) (1994).
61. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000).
62. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that a grazing permit
holder must graze the allotment, and grazing permits could not be issued for "conservation use" (non-
grazing) purposes as the Clinton-Babbitt rule provided). By not appealing to the Supreme Court, the
Clinton Administration gave up conservation use permits.
63. See Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1227-1340 (1995); See
Howard Latin, Ideal and Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 'Fine-
Tuning' Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267 (1985); See The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 85
(1990); See The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 (1972).
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"faith and confidence in the powers of technical and social planning and
engineering." 64 Hays describes this Progressive conservation vision as the
gospel of efficiency: "[tihe crux of the gospel of efficiency lay in a rational
and scientific method of making basic technological decisions through a
single, central authority., 65 The policy is also reflective of interest-group
liberalism, in which organized private interests play a significant role in
determining and administering the policies that affect them.66 Policies sur-
rounding grazing have long been a subject of controversy due to their envi-
ronmental consequences, economic impacts, and prioritization of ranching
activity above other uses of the public domain.
B. Environmental Controversies
In 1994, the journal Conservation Biology devoted an issue to "Cows and
Conservation Biology," and the editor acknowledged that "we can expect a
clash of expert opinions on the livestock grazing issue. 67 This clash is
fueled by contradictory activist polemics, conflicting scientific claims, and
protracted legal battles.
According to Stimpert:
[T]he scientific literature conclusively demonstrate[s] that
moderate, controlled livestock grazing is beneficial, com-
patible with ard rangeland ecosystems, and sustainable....
Ranchers maintain an important cultural heritage, contrib-
ute to the economy, produce food for the nation, preserve
the open Western landscape, and prevent environmentally
and aesthetically damaging land use .... [T]he idea that
the ranchers have little to no legal right to graze is a false-
hood created by those who wish to eliminate grazing.68
Law professor Debra Donahue counters: "[t]he conclusion is inescap-
able: much of the range science literature, and many agency publications,
are propaganda or apology, not sound science or management advice." 69
According to Donahue, livestock grazing "can wreak havoc on the envi-
64. Hess, supra n.34, at 119. Progressive refers to the early twentieth century Progressive Era
philosophy espoused by Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, that the nation's resources should be
used responsibly, managed by government on the basis of scientific principles, and not on the basis of
the greed of big industrialists or the corruption of political bosses.
65. Hays, supra n. 48, at 271.
66. Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, pp. 71-79
(2nd ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1969). Robert Nelson argues that Progressivism and interest-group liber-
alism are generally anti-thetical, and that public lands policies frequently have Progressive scientific
management "window dressing" over the interest group politics reality. See Robert H. Nelson, Public
Land and Private Rights: The Failure of Scientific Management (Rowman and Littlefield 1995); See
also Klyza, supra n. 44.
67. Reed F. Noss, Cows and Conservation Biology, 8 Conserv. Biology 615 (1994).
68. Stimpert, supra n. 30, at 518-519, 529.
69. Donahue, supra n. 32, at 727.
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ronment" and cause "irreversible" ecological damage.7 ° She argues that
grazing is the "least valuable" commercial use of public lands, that few
western communities are economically dependent on grazing, and that a
particular "ranching way of life" is not identifiable.7'
Conservation biologists agree that heavy grazing, especially in arid land-
scapes, has a detrimental impact on the environment. According to Reed
Noss, grazing in the American West:
... has contributed to the loss of native vegetation, invasions
by alien plants, decline of native fisheries due to dewater-
ing of streams for irrigation and degradation of riparian
zones, eradication of native carnivores and prairie dogs,
diseases in native herbivores, and major changes in fire
frequency, hydrology, soils, and other ecosystem proper-
ties. Many conservationists claim that livestock grazing
has done more damage to the native biodiversity of western
North America than all the chainsaws and bulldozers com-
bined.72
However, some ranching advocates and range ecologists argue that light
to moderate grazing has a positive environmental impact. In a report pre-
pared for the federal government, Resource Concepts, Inc. argued that "the
practice of grazing rangelands is possibly the best example of low-input
agriculture known today, requiring very little fossil fuel when compared to
many other forms of agriculture. Livestock are turned out to graze, rotated
from one grazing unit to another, or herded through an area while harvest-
ing forage. These animals convert natural forage into red meat protein for
human consumption, along with other products .... [M]anaged grazing
helps to sustain native plant communities and wildlife populations. 73 Ac-
cording to Holechek, "[iun the semi-arid shrubland ranges of the Southwest
and intermountain regions, light grazing can be a useful means of improv-
ing forage production. 74 The problem, he argues, is that government pro-
grams, especially cost subsidies, "encourage ranchers to maximize livestock
numbers on private and public rangelands, often at the expense of land con-
servation. 75
70. Id. at 723, 726.
71. Id. at 723,728, 730.
72. Noss, supra n. 67, at 618. See also Fleischner, supra n. 39; See also Johanna H. Wald, Belea-
guered Rangelands Signify Policy Failure, 11 Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 34 (1996).
73. Resource Concepts, Inc., Executive Summary: Nevada Grazing Statistics Report and Economic
Analysis for Federal Lands in Nevada 12, http://agri.state.nv.us/graze/PDF/Executive%20Summary.pdf
(Mar. 26, 2001).
74. Holechek, supra n. 39, at 347; See also Jerry Holechek et al., Moderate and Light Cattle Graz-
ing Effects on Chihuahuan Desert Rangelands, 56 J. of Range Mgt. 133 (2003).
75. Holechek, supra n. 39, at 360.
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C. Economic Controversies
Cost subsidies are central to a second major controversy and serve as the
basis for criticism that grazing on public lands is a welfare entitlement for
wealthy and corporate ranchers. Currently, approximately 20,000 permit
holders graze millions of livestock on more than 260 million acres of public
land: over 30,000 allotments exist, ranging in size from a few acres to hun-
dreds of thousands of acres.76 According to the Government Accounting
Office ("GAO"), federal agencies spent $144.3 million in 2004 to support
grazing. Grazing permits and leases generated about $21 million, less than
one-sixth of expenditures to manage grazing. 77 In 1978, PRIA set the Bu-
reau of Land Management and Forest Service fee formulas, which extended
under Executive Order 12548. According to the GAO, the purpose of the
fee is to "account for livestock industry prices and to support ranchers and
the western livestock industry," and "not primarily to recover the agencies'
expenditures or to capture the fair market value of the forage.,
78
In early 2007, the federal government announced a reduction in grazing
fees, prompting Greta Anderson, Range Restoration Director for the anti-
grazing Center for Biological Diversity, to say, "[a] small number of West-
ern livestock operators, producing less than three percent of the beef we eat,
pay less per month to feed their cows than it costs to feed a hamster.
Meanwhile those cows are befouling our rivers, accelerating erosion, and
driving rare species toward extinction on lands that belong to the American
people., 79 The anti-grazing Forest Guardians denounce the "wing-tipped
welfare cowboys," pointing out that grazing permits on millions of acres of
public lands are held by large energy companies, real estate developers, and
other corporations. Grazing permits are held, for example, by Union Oil,
Getty Oil, Texaco, Anheuser-Busch, John Hancock, and wealthy individu-
als such as Bill Hewlett, David Packard (of Hewlett-Packard), and Jack
Simplot (founder of an agribusiness conglomerate and one of Forbes 500
76. GAO Report, Livestock Grazing: Federal Expenditures and Receipts Vary, Depending on the
Agency and the Purpose of Fee Charged, GAO-05-869, pp. 10, 12, http://www.gao.govlnew.items/
d05869.pdf (Sept. 2005)
77. GAO Report, Livestock Grazing: Federal Expenditures and Receipts Vary, Depending on the
Agency and the Purpose of Fee Charged, GAO-05-869, 5-6, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO5869.pdf
(Sept. 2005); See also GAO Report, Rangeland Management: Profile of the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment's Grazing Allotments and Permits, GAO/RCED-92-213FS, http://archive.gao.gov/d32tl0/
146906.pdf (June 1992); See also GAO Report, Rangeland Management: Profile of the Forest Service's
Grazing Allotments and Permittees, GAO/RCED-93-141FS, http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/149111.pdf
(Apr. 1993).
78. GAO Report, Livestock Grazing, supra n. 76, at 6-7.
79. Center for Biological Diversity, Federal Government Lowers Cost of Public Lands Grazing
For Livestock Owners: Cost Rises for Taxpayers, http://www.biologicaldiversity.orgfswcbd/PRESS/
grazing-fee-02-02-2007.html (Feb. 2, 2007).
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wealthiest individuals).8° One recent study concluded that half of permit
holders are "hobby" ranchers and not dependent on ranching income. 8'
The National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA) argues that the
GAO "fails to account for costs and benefits of range management not
measured on a balance sheet.",82 The NCBA argues that, in addition to pay-
ing grazing fees, ranchers invest millions of dollars in range improvements.
Ranchers' financial investments and physical work on the range save tax-
payers money by improving public rangelands without consuming tax
money and the time of government employees. They also benefit the public
by preserving open space and biodiversity. 83 Professor Richard Knight, in
testimony before the Senate Public Lands and Forests Subcommittee, ar-
gued that ranching is the "oldest sustainable use of western lands," and
"more than any other justification, the timeless traditions of ranching le-
gitimize its existence and continuation." 84 According to Knight, subsidies
sustain ranchers, who serve as stewards of the land, protectors of open
space, and practitioners of a western culture and way of life worth preserv-
ing.8
5
IV. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: THE TRAILS TAKEN
Upon assuming the Presidency, among the myriad issues faced by Bush
was the controversy over public lands grazing. The President's "cowboy
capitalist" ideology suggested that government planning and regulation of
public land uses should give way to market-driven decisions. As an indus-
try, public lands ranching is heavily regulated by the federal government.
According to Hess and Holochek, "the land and grass are federal property,
planning and management are federal functions, and the workers-the
27,000 ranchers who own the livestock-are federally licensed, supervised,
and subsidized. From the building of fences and watering holes to setting
how, when, and where to graze, grazing on public lands is in every sense a
command-and-control economy. 86 A president cannot pursue an agenda or
80. Forest Guardians, Wing-Tipped Welfare Cowboys Ride the Range, http://www.fguardians.org/
support docs/factsheet~wing-tip-welfare-cowboys.pdf (Jan. 21, 2006); William Kittredge, Free Range,
vol. 209, pg. 16, The New Republic, 16-17 (Dec. 13, 1993).
81. Bradley J. Gentner & John A. Tanaka, Classifying Federal Public Land Grazing Permittees, 55
J. of Range Mgt 2 (2002).
82. Maggie Beal, Contrary to GAO Report, Public Lands Grazing Provides Numerous Benefits 30,
http://www.beefusa.org/uDocs/grazing293.pdf (Jan.-Feb., 2006).
83. Id.
84. Sen. Subcomm. on Pub. Lands & Forests of the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Resources, Ranch-
ers as Keystone Species in a Healthy West, http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=1500&WitnessID=4272 (Sept. 28, 2005). See also James H.
Brown and William McDonald, "Livestock Grazing and Conservation on Southwestern Rangelands, 9
Conservation Biology 1646 (1995).
85. Id; See also Jeremy D. Maestas, Richard L. Knight, & Wendell C. Gilgert, Biodiversity Across
a Rural Land-Use Gradient, 17 Conserv. Biology 1425 (2003).
86. Karl Hess, Jr. & Jerry L. Holechek, Beyond the Grazing Fee: An Agenda for Rangeland Re-
form, Cato Policy Analysis No. 234, July 13, 1995 at www.cato.org/pubslpas/pa-234.html. Hess and
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leave an ideological stamp on policies unilaterally and has a limited box of
tools from which to draw. President Bush needed to persuade other policy
actors to cooperate, and the tools at his disposal included rhetorical exhorta-
tion, legislative bargaining, and regulatory manipulation.87 He faced a stiff
challenge.
A. Appointments
Modem presidents have used appointments to executive agencies as one
tool to pursue their agenda in a complex environment of competing power
centers. Administrative appointees may exercise discretion to change
agency rules, budgets, statutory interpretations, and enforcement priorities,
or to advance presidential goals that face congressional resistance. 88  Ad-
ministrative appointments offer clues about the president's policy priorities
and general ideological tone. These clues can be ambiguous, however,
since appointments also reflect political calculations about the need to pla-
cate rival party factions. The Presdient may also seek to promote ethnic,
regional, or ideological diversity, and to present appointees willing to face
an intense vetting process before a Senate confirmation panel.89
While many agencies oversee grazing on public lands, the Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM") oversees most of the public land used for graz-
ing. The Forest Service ("USFS") also has significant responsibilities. 90
Although many of the political appointees in these agencies can impact
policy formulation and implementation, the highest profile appointees pro-
vide a substantive indication of the President's ideological direction.91 On
December 29, 2000, President Bush nominated Gale Norton to be Secretary
of the Interior. She was confirmed by the Senate on January 30, 2001, after
Holochek criticize public land grazing policies for being an overly-subsidized and government-managed
industry.
87. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, pg. 2 (4th ed., CQ
Press 2006); Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modem Presidents: The Politics of Leader-
ship from Roosevelt to Reagan, pp. 21-40 (Free Press 1991); David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Bu-
reaucracy: Management Imperatives in a Separation of Powers System, in The Presidency and the
Political System, pp. 410-429 (Michael Nelson 8th ed., CQ Press 2006).
88. Richard Nathan, The Administrative Presidency (John Wiley & Sons 1983); Terry Moe, The
Politicized Presidency, in The New Direction in American Politics (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson,
eds., Brookings Instn. Press 1985); Robert F. Durant & Adam L. Warber, Networking in the Shadow of
Hierarchy: Public Policy, the Administrative Presidency, and the Neoadministrative State, 31 Pres.
Stud. Q. 221 (2001).
89. Thomas E. Cronin & Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, pp.
252-256 (2nd ed., Oxford U. Press 2004) (for example, Bush appointed a moderate from a Democratic
state, Christine Todd Whitman as EPA Administrator).
90. Ten federal agencies manage grazing on over 260 million acres of public lands. The BLM and
the USFS manage grazing on 98 percent of those lands. GAO Report, Livestock Grazing, supra n77, pg.
5.
91. See Mother Jones, The Ungreening of America: Behind the Curtain, http://www.mother-
jones.com/news/feature/2003/09/ma53401.html (September-October 2003) (Space does not permit
examination of several important appointees, including Bush's first Secretary of Agriculture, agribusi-
ness lawyer Ann Veneman, and her assistant Mark Rey, a former logging industry official as Undersec-
retary for Natural Resources and Environment).
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a contentious debate.92 At the time of her appointment, Norton was senior
counsel at Brownstein, Hyatt, and Farber, a Colorado-based law firm that
represents and lobbies for a wide-range of corporate clients. She was also a
trustee of the market-oriented think tank the Independence Institute, and a
registered lobbyist for NL Industries, a global manufacturing, chemical and
mining company. After she graduated from law school in 1978, Norton
joined the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a public interest law firm
founded by James Watt that describes itself as "one of the Nation's leading
legal centers fighting environmental overkill. '' 93 In the 1980s, Norton was a
delegate to the Libertarian Party national convention, a scholar at the con-
servative Hoover Institution, and a fellow at the Political Economy Re-
search Center ("PERC"), a research institute dedicated to free market envi-
ronmentalism. She also served under President Reagan as as an official at
the Department of Agriculture and as Associate Solicitor at the DOI. In
1990 Norton was elected Attorney General of Colorado, a post she held
through 1999.94 During that period, Norton earned a reputation as a critic
of government regulation and environmental laws that she regarded as un-
constitutional, such as the Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act,
and the Endangered Species Act. She was an outspoken advocate of prop-
erty rights, "environmental federalism," and a free market environmental-
ism that would rely on market incentives rather than government mandates.
In 2000, she was part of a libertarian group that advised then-presidential
candidate George W. Bush on environmental issues.95
Norton's nomination garnered praise from market-oriented interest
groups and condemnation from the major environmental organizations.
The Heartland Institute described Norton as an "outstanding choice" that
believed in giving local communities and private property owners "the
principal role in protecting natural resources." 96  The Libertarian Party
called Norton's nomination a "giant leap for Libertarian-style environ-
mental policies .... She seems to support a sensible free market environ-
92. The Senate vote was 75-24. Lizette Alvarez, Senate Confirms Nominees For EPA and Interior
Posts, N.Y. Times at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE7D61F3FF932A05752COA9679C8B63&sec=&s
pon=.
93. Mountain States Legal Foundation, Featured Environmental Litigation Laws: Communities for
a Great Northwest v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, http://www.mountainstateslegal.orgflegal-cases_cate-
gory-home.cfm?casecategoryid=5 (March 30, 2008).
94. Norton lost the Colorado Republican Senate primary to current Senator Wayne Allard in 1996.
No author, Senate Nominees Picked in Colorado, N.Y. Times, August 15, 1996 at http://notes.sej.org/
sej/sejoum.nsf/2 1 fd4c7bbafal be5862568a50017a819/99893ada96f7d89586256dI f00037249$FIL.E/sej
_fa99.pdf.
95. The group included Terry Anderson, co-author of Free Market Environmentalism, Lynn Scar-
lett, President of the libertarian Reason Foundation, and Stephen Hayward, contributing editor of Rea-
son Magazine. Margie Kriz, Bush on Environment: Leading Republican Candidate Reveals Team and
Policies, SEJoumal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Fall 1999), pg. 19 at http:Hwww. notes.sej.org/sej/sejouma.nsf/
21 fd4c7bbafalbe5862568a5OOl7a819/99893ada96f7d89586256d I f0037249/$FILE/sej_fa99.pdf.
96. Joseph Best, Norton Confirmation is Boon for Common-Sense Environmentalism, The Heart-
land Institute, http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld= 1163 (Mar. 1, 2001).
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mentalism that balances the need for a healthy planet with the importance
of liberty, property rights, and limited government." 97 Terry Anderson, of
the Property and Environment Research Center, said of Norton, "[i]nside
Gale's head is a flashing sign that says 'incentives matter,' that's the es-
sence of free market environmentalism."
98
Environmental interest groups denounced the Norton appointment. A
2001 Sierra Club press release claimed that Norton was "an anti-
environmental extremist whose record as a lobbyist for polluters, an attor-
ney for loggers and miners, and a prot6g6 of James Watt makes her unfit to
be Secretary of the Interior." 99 The Natural Resources Defense Council,
joining with the Wilderness Society in opposing Norton's nomination, said,
"[h]er positions and beliefs are fundamentally incompatible with the Secre-
tary of Interior's responsibilities for the stewardship of our precious natural
resource heritage. ' 1°°
During her tenure as the Secretary of the Interior from 2001 to 2006,
Norton expressed support for "non-coercive, market-based ways of achiev-
ing positive environmental results," and "economic incentive approaches as
an alternative to command-and-control regulation." 10 1 In a speech in 2002,
she said, "[w]e need a new environmentalism, based on what I call 'the
Four C's' - Communication, Consultation, and Cooperation, all in the
service of Conservation. At the heart of the Four C's is the belief that for
conservation to be successful, we must involve the people who live on,
work on, and love the land and the water."10 2 Throughout her tenure, Nor-
ton promoted her vision of a "new environmentalism" through "cooperative
conservation," despite much criticism that she was too cooperative with the
extractive industries and other polluters.10 3 Norton resigned in March 2006
and took a job as general counsel for Royal Dutch Shell in its "unconven-
tional resources" division, which recovers oil from shale and extra-heavy
oils.
1°4
On August 21, 2001, President Bush appointed Kathleen B. Clarke as Di-
rector of the BLM. She was unanimously confirmed by the Senate on De-
cember 20, 2001. At the time of her appointment Clarke was serving as the
97. The Libertarian Party, Gale Norton is 'Giant Leap' for Environmental Sense, http://www.
ontheissues.org/Celeb/Libertarian_PartyEnvironment.htm (Jan. 17, 2001).
98. Lynette Warren, Gale Norton: Enviro-Capitalist, Union Square J., http://www.unionsquare-
joumal.com/warrenarchive02l50l.htn (Feb. 15, 2001).
99. Sierra Club, Gale Norton: The Extreme Anti-Environmental Agenda, http://www.common-
dreams.org/news2001/0109-13.htm (Jan. 9, 2001).
100. Natural Resource Defense Council, Feinstein and Boxer Urged to Oppose Norton Nomination,
http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressReleases/010118a.asp (Jan. 18, 2001).
101. Gale Norton, Remarks, Remarks Prepared for the Sand County Foundation (Sand County
Foundation, Apr. 18, 2002) (available at http://www.doi.gov/news/020424.html).
102. Id.
103. See Gale Norton's Ugly Legacy, The Lompoc Record, http://www.lompocrecord.com/articles/
2006/03/15/opinions/031506b.txt (Mar. 15, 2006).
104. Steve McMillan, Norton Will Join Royal Dutch Shell, Denver Post, http://www.denver-
post.com/business/ci_4910177 (Dec. 27, 2006).
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Director of the Utah Department of Natural Resources. She previously
served on the staff of the Republican United States Senator Wallace Ben-
nett and Republican Congressman James Hansen. Her appointment drew
praise from Utah industry associations and criticism from Utah environ-
mental organizations. Lee Peacock, President of the Utah Petroleum Asso-
ciation, said, "[w]e believe her appointment is good for Utah and Western
oil and gas."' 05 Her critics claimed that as Director of Utah's Department
of Natural Resources, Clarke "quickly became a favorite of the state's min-
ing and drilling industry."' 6 Mike Reberg of the Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance said, "[s]he's bought onto the Bush-Cheney energy plan and
shown that in her actions here, and that's bad for Utah wilderness, [and]
bad for American wilderness."' 
7
At her Senate confirmation hearings, Clarke expressed a vague and gen-
eral commitment that BLM would "take a balanced approach in conserving
our public lands while sustaining their productivity."' 10 8 Two years later, in
a speech to the Society for Range Management, she assured ranchers that
the BLM would not change grazing fee formulas nor seek to improve range
health by moving cattle off the land. She made it clear that the BLM saw
ranchers as partners in the management of the range: "[w]e'll never have
enough BLM employees, and I don't think any of you would want us to
have as many as it would take to steward the 170 million acres of BLM
rangelands. But, working with the ranching community, we'll have all the
eyes and ears and hands and hearts we need to be successful in the work we
do." °9 Clarke also criticized grazing reforms enacted by the Clinton Ad-
ministration that had been unpopular among ranchers:
Some of you may remember fondly the days when BLM
was called the, or referred to, as the Bureau of Livestock
and Mining, and based on what's happened in the last dec-
ade, some people think it's much closer to the Bureau of
Landscapes and Monuments. But I'm here today to tell you
we're still interested in multiple use and my motivation for
coming to this agency was to secure this mission.
0
Clarke noted that the BLM would soon issue notice of intent to change
some of those Clinton era rules,"' and she encouraged ranchers to provide
comments.
105. Kent Larsen, Mormon Woman to be First to Head BLM, Mormon News, www.mormonsto-
day.com010831/T2KClarke01.shtml (Aug. 31, 2007).
106. The Ungreening of America: Behind the Curtain, supra n. 91.
107. Larsen, supra n. 105.
108. Sen. Energy and Nat. Resources Comm., Confirmation Hearings, http:lwww.blm.gov/nhp/
news/legislative/pages/2001/teOl I 114.htm (Nov. 14, 2001) (Kathleen B. Clarke, testifying).
109. Kathleen B. Clarke, Speech, (Society for Range Management, Casper, Wyo., Feb. 2, 2003).
110. Id.
I l. Infra nn. 126-145 (discussing regulatory reforms).
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Several other Bush-appointees in the DOI reflect these political and pol-
icy priorities. J. Steven Griles became Deputy Secretary of the Interior in
July 2001. At the time of his appointment, Griles was the President of J.
Steven Griles and Associates, a lobbying firm representing coal, oil, gas
and electric companies. He was also a principal of National Environmental
Strategies, another lobbying firm for the coal, oil, and gas industries.
12
Prior to his lobbying career, Griles served in the DOI under Reagan as As-
sistant Secretary for Lands and Minerals Management, Deputy Assistant for
Land and Water, and Deputy Director of the Office of Surface Mining.
Griles' appointment was praised by Norton, who said that Griles brought
"enormous institutional knowledge as well as extensive experience in
bringing all voices together to turn environmental and energy conflicts into
sound solutions.', 1 3  Environmental groups denounced the appointment,
calling Griles "the Mike Tyson of the coal and industry operatives." ' 1 4 As
an industry lobbyist and former Reagan Administration official, Griles
earned a reputation as an aggressive supporter of oil, gas, and coal devel-
opment, and a staunch critic of government regulation of those industries.
His tenure in the DOI under President Bush was marked by constant con-
troversy, as he was investigated for ethics violations regarding his contin-
ued close contact with former industry clients. He resigned in 2005 and
resumed his position as an industry lobbyist. In 2007 he pled guilty to
charges of lying to Congress about his relationship with convicted lobbyist
Jack Abramoff, and was sentenced to ten months in prison.'
15
President Bush appointed William G. Myers I as Solicitor of the DOI,
its chief legal officer and third-ranking official. At the time of his appoint-
ment, Myers worked with the law firm of Holland and Hart, where he rep-
resented grazing and mining interests. He previously served as Director of
Federal Lands for the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, and Execu-
tive Director of the Public Lands Council, an organization of ranchers
formed by the NCBA, the American Sheep Industry, and the Association of
National Grasslands. A staunch critic of numerous environmental laws, he
challenged Rangeland Reform 94, the Clinton Administration's grazing
reform, on behalf of the ranching industry.!16 He had described Rangeland
112. Dept. of the Interior, Press Release, Norton Announces Nomination of J. Steven Griles to Serve
as Deputy Secretary of the Interior (Mar. 8, 2001) (available at http://www.doi.gov/news/
010308a.html).
113. Id.
114. Friends of the Earth, Press Release, Watchdogging the Interior Department (Mar. 16, 2001)
(available at http://www.foe.org/camps/eco/interior/opposegrilespr.html).
115. See U.S. Dept. of Jus., Attachment A: Factual Basis for the Plea of James Steven Griles,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/press-releases/2007/03/2007 570-4-03-23-07griles-fact.pdf (Mar.
20, 2007).
116. In 1997 testimony before a House Subcommittee, Meyers said regarding PLC v. Babbitt, 529
U.S. 728 (2000): "I was the person who helped coordinate the five plaintiffs in the bringing of that suit
and helped hire the attorneys." H.R. Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poulty of the H.R. Comm. on
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Reform 94 as "little more than a massive new regulatory regime designed to
restrict livestock operators on some 220 million acres of federal land....
[It] epitomizes the flawed belief that centralized government can promote
environmentalism by dictating national standards."' 1 7 As Solicitor, Myers
continued to criticize environmental regulations that he believed burdened
ranchers and allowed government to micromanage land use decisions. In a
speech to the NCBA he said, "[t]he biggest disaster now facing ranchers is
not nature... but a flood of regulations designed to turn the West into little
more than a theme park."' 8 In a speech to the Nevada Cattlemen's Asso-
ciation, Myers complained, "[i]t has gotten to the point where you can
hardly dig a post hole without having to do an environmental analysis."'" 9
Myers' sympathy for the ranching industry earned him praise from its
lobbyists. John Falen, past president of the Nevada Cattlemen's Associa-
tion, said, "Bill's our friend. It's been a long time since we had a friend in
the solicitor's office."'120 In 2002, Myers wrote a controversial memoran-
dum reversing statutory interpretations of the Clinton Administration and
making it more difficult for conservation groups to purchase grazing
permits from ranchers in order to retire them. 121 In 2003, Myers resigned
when President Bush nominated him to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Washington), although his nomination was ultimately
blocked by Senate Democrats. In 2005, the Inspector General issued a let-
ter criticizing Myers for circumventing normal procedures, ignoring Justice
Department concerns, and engaging in "an inappropriate level of program-
matic involvement" in BLM settlement talks with a well-connected Wyo-
ming rancher accused of violating federal grazing laws. 122
Lynn Scarlett was confirmed in July 2001 as the Assistant Secretary of
the Interior for Policy, Management, and Budget. In 2005 she was named
Deputy Secretary of the Interior (and served as Acting Secretary for a brief
period in 2006 after Norton's resignation). At the time of her appointment,
Scarlett was the President of the Reason Foundation, a libertarian research
institute and publisher of the libertarian magazine Reason. She published
Agric., Forage Improvement Act of 1997, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ag/hagforage.000/
hagforage_0f.htm (Sept. 17, 1997).
117. William G. Myers III, Western Ranchers Fed Up with the Feds, 11 Forum for Applied Re-
search and Pub. Policy 22, 25 (1996).
118. The Ungreening ofnAmerica, supra n. 91.
119. Scott Sonner, Fed Official Assuages Ranchers, Las Vegas Rev. J., http://www.reviewjour-
nal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Nov- I 6-Sat-2002/news/20079539.html (Nov. 16, 2002).
120. Id.
121. Office of the Solicitor, Dept. of Interior, Memorandum M-37008, http://www.rangebiome.org/
headlines/nr/myersmemo.pdf (Oct. 4, 2002). A Solicitor's memorandum expresses the Department's
legal position and is binding on the Department's offices and officials.
122. Earl E. Devaney, Inspector General, Dept. of Interior, "Letter to Jeffery Ruch, Executive Direc-
tor, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility," http://www.peer.orgldocs/doil2005-16 2
doijigletter.pdf (Feb. 10, 2005).
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numerous articles on free market environmentalism or, what she called
"new environmentalism," and was an environmental advisor to George W.
Bush during his candidacy. Scarlett was a long-time critic of "traditional
environmentalism," which she claimed was "shaped by people who de-
manded that environmental values trump all other considerations and who
assumed that regulatory elite possessed all necessary knowledge."'' 23 Ac-
cording to Scarlett, traditional environmentalism "fail[ed] to appreciate the
power of incentives to change behavior." The "new environmentalism," in
contrast, "views economic incentives as critical determinants of behavior.
For this reason, the new vision views markets and the property rights on
which they depend as tools for environmental problem solving."' 24 In a
2004 interview she said, "to a certain extent, Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'
has a green thumb."'' 25 Scarlett argued that the Administration's policy was
to move "beyond the punitive, prescriptive regulations of the last thirty
years-to include programs that engage local communities in environ-
mental stewardship and stimulate markets in the direction of environmental
innovation.'
' 26
President Bush's top level appointments to the positions most closely
connected to public lands management were a mix of those seeking to
maintain traditional access to public lands resources, and those pursuing a
free-market regulatory agenda. Norton and Scarlett brought to their posi-
tions a clear ideological inclination towards a free market policy agenda
consistent with Bush's cowboy capitalism. Both had a record of publica-
tions, speeches, and organizational affiliations that reflected pro-market
policies. Clarke, Myers, and Griles pursued the agenda of regulated indus-
tries, which also aimed to reduce command and control regulation, but sup-
ported government subsidies. Myers was especially associated with ranch-
ing interests that sought to protect most aspects of the status quo, while
rolling back more recent and restrictive environmental regulations.
B. Regulatory Changes
Among the Bush Administration's most significant efforts regarding
grazing on public lands were proposed changes to grazing regulations is-
sued on July 12, 2006 following several years of public hearings and revi-
sions. When announcing the proposed changes, Secretary Norton said,
"[t]he proposed rule will help public lands ranchers stay on the land," and it
123. Lynn Scarlett, Evolutionary Ecology, Reason, http:/www.reason.comlnews/printer/29925.html
(May 2006).
124. Lynn Scarlett, New Environmentalism 3-4, http://www.ncpa.orgpub/st/st2Ol/st2Ol.pdf (Jan.
1997).
125. Amanda Griscom, Interior Design: An Interview with Interior's Lynn Scarlett, One of the
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"recognizes that ranching is crucial not only to the economies of Western
rural communities, but also to the history, social fabric, and cultural identity
of these communities.' 27 Director Clarke said, "[tihis proposed rule re-
flects our Agency's commitment to continue livestock grazing as one of the
legitimate uses of the public lands .... [The rule] is a major step forward
for effective, efficient public rangeland management.' 128  The "Back-
ground" section asserts, "[t]he final rule recognizes the many benefits of
livestock grazing on public lands, including its social and economic contri-
butions to rural communities and its preservation of open space in the rap-
idly growing West, as well as the importance of maintaining healthy range-
lands and wildlife habitat."1 29 A "Questions and Answers" sheet from the
BLM that accompanied the rule explained that the new grazing regulations
were intended to "improve the agency's working relationship with public
lands ranchers (permittees and lessees), conserve rangeland resources, and
enhance administrative efficiency.'
' 30
To improve working relations with ranchers, the rule provided that per-
mittees would share title to future range improvements, such as fences,
wells, or pipelines, thereby repealing a provision of Rangeland Reform 94,
which gave sole title to the United States. The rule requires that a grazing
use decrease (or increase) of more than ten percent be phased in more
slowly (over five years), unless the operator agrees to a shorter period.' 3' It
requires the BLM to use "consistent" methodology when documenting the
social, cultural, and economic impacts of grazing decisions. The rule also
requires the BLM to cooperate with local ranchers and boards in reviewing
grazing allotment plans.
32
To conserve rangeland resources, the rule allows livestock operators to
rest the land as needed by applying for a non-use grazing permit each year.
Current regulations limit non-use to three consecutive years, after which
time a permit holder must graze the allotment. The new regulation, as the
first sentence states, allowed non-use to be authorized each year. The regu-
lation prohibited BLM from assuming that grazing practices were the main
cause of a failure to meet rangeland health standards. However, it required
the agency to use "monitoring data" to document and to better understand
127. Department of the Interior, Press Release, Interior Secretary Announces Proposed Grazing
Rule That Would Improve Grazing Management, Help Continue Public Lands Ranching (Dec. 5, 2003)
(available at www.blm.govlnhp/news/releases/pages/2003/prO3l205_grazing.htm).
128. Id.
129. "Factsheet on the BLM's New Grazing Regulations," Bureau of Land Management, US De-
partment of the Interior, July 12, 2006 at 1. (http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/releases/pages/2006/
prO6O712July2006_GrazingFactSheet.pdf).
130. Bureau of Land Mgt., Questions and Answers re: the BLM's New Grazing Regulations, http://
www.blm.gov/nhp/news/releases/pages/20061pr060712_- July2006_GrazRuleQs&As.pdf (July 12, 2006).
131. An increase or decrease in "grazing use" may mean a change in the permitted number of ani-
mals, or the number of days they may be grazed. 71 Fed. Reg. 39,404 (2006).
132. Id. at 39,404, 39,405.
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the role of various grazing practices in the allotment's failure. 33 In cases
where grazing practices are at issue, the new rule allows up to twenty four
months, whereas the old rule required an action plan "prior to the next graz-
ing season." The BLM asserts that twenty four months is a more realistic
timeframe for developing scientifically sound remedies. 134
The new rule eliminated long-term "conservation use" permits in order to
comply with federal court rulings. 135 It also restores the pre-1995 definition
of "grazing preference" to include an amount of forage on public lands
linked to a rancher's "base" property, as opposed to the current regulations,
which define "grazing preference" as precedence in the "line."'
136
To enhance administrative efficiency, the new rule modified the defini-
tion of "interested public," reducing the range of groups that the agency
must consult prior to making specific grazing decisions. 137 It also reversed
provisions of Rangeland Reform 94 by limiting the ability of the BLM to
cancel permits or otherwise act against permitees that have been convicted
of violations that did not occur on their allotment. The rule also limited the
range of BLM decisions that trigger protest and appeal under the Endan-
gered Species Act.
138
The BLM issued an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to document
the ecological, cultural, social, and economic effects that would result from
the proposed regulation changes. The EIS predicted "short-term adverse
effects" on the environment from the five-year phase-in for changes in use
over ten percent, the monitoring required before attributing poor rangeland
health to livestock grazing, and the time extension allowed for implement-
133. Id. at 39,421. The rule does not address stocking levels which are "better addressed during the
land use and activity planning process." See also 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100.
134. The prior rule allowed the BLM to order a reduction in the number of animals and a change in
the season of use, but not until the next grazing season. The new rule allowed the BLM to change graz-
ing practices within 24 months. President Bush and other advocates of the new rule argued that if given
more time, scientifically sound remedies other than grazing reductions could be developed to improve
rangeland health.
135. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d at 1292.
136. The owner of a "base property" that acquires a grazing permit holds a "preference" for forage
on the public lands. The old regulations defined "preference" as a priority position for renewing a permit
or securing additional forage. The new regulations define the "preference" a permit holder has in terms
of an actual quantity of forage, restoring the pre-1995 definition, and providing more assurance that a
certain number of animals may be maintained on the allotment. Compare 43 C.F.R. 4100.0-5 (1995)
with 43 C.F.R. 4100.0-5 (2006).
137. According to the BLM, "in-depth involvement of the public in day-to-day management deci-
sions is neither warranted nor administratively efficient.. Cooperation with permittees and lessees, on
the other hand, usually results in more expeditious steps to address resource conditions and can help
avoid lengthy administrative appeals." 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100.
138. This is a general summary of the many rule changes made in the "Final Rule." See also BLM,
Factsheet on the BLM's New Grazing Regulations, http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/releases/pages/2006/
pr060712_July2006_GrazingFactSheet.pdf (July 12, 2006); See also BLM, Questions and Answers re:
the BLM's New Grazing Regulations, http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/releases/pages/2006/prO60712-
July2006_GrazRuleQs&As.pdf (July 12, 2006). The Congressional Research Service has also produced
a concise summary of the process and substance of the regulation changes. Carol Hardy Vincent, Graz-
ing Regulations: Changes by the BLM, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order
Code RL32244, (Mar. 15, 2007).
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ing remedial action. In the long-term, the BLM anticipates that the use of
monitoring data and the longer timeframe for implementing grazing
changes will be "beneficial to rangeland health," since the BLM can no
longer mandate quick reductions without sound data. 1
39
The BLM rejected comments by the Fish and Wildlife Service, which
claimed that the proposed rule threatened fish and wildlife, made grazing a
priority over other uses, was inadequate to protect "sensitive species and
their habitat," and could compromise the ability of the BLM to "manage the
public's resources to the degree necessary to insure their health.' 40 The
BLM also rejected the conclusions of two of its staff scientists, who had
participated in drafting the EIS and concluded that the new rule would ad-
versely affect water quality, wildlife, and riparian habitats.'
41
After the BLM issued the new regulations, a number of environmental
groups filed lawsuits alleging that the proposed rule violated existing public
participation statutes, and failed to comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), which requires an EIS to be "comprehensive." In
2007, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho pointed out that
BLM's new regulations "limit public input from the non-ranching public,
offer ranchers more rights on the BLM land, restrict the BLM's monitoring
of grazing damage, extend the deadlines for corrective action, and dilute the
BLM's authority to sanction ranchers for grazing violations. While the
BLM justifies the changes as making it more efficient, the BLM was not
their originator-it was the grazing industry and its supporters that first
proposed them."' 142 The court ruled that the regulatory attempt to limit pub-
lic input into BLM grazing decisions and to delay implementation of cor-
rective actions violated NEPA and FLPMA.143 Moreover, the BLM's fail-
ure to adequately consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) about
the impacts of the proposed rule on sensitive species and habitat violated
the Endangered Species Act. 144 The court enjoined the new regulations. 45
The Bush Administration sought to ease the regulatory burden and spur
investment in public rangeland improvements through regulatory changes
supported by the livestock industry. These changes met fierce resistance
139. Department of the Interior, Proposed Revisions to Grazing Regulations for the Public Lands:
Final Environmental Impact Statement ES-5 (Oct. 2004).
140. BLM, Bureau of Land Management Proposed Rule for Grazing Administration--Exclusive of
Alaska and the Proposed Revisions to Grazing Regulations forthe Public Lands Draft Environmental
Impact Statement 2-7, http://www.fguardians.org/support-docs/BLM_FWS-draft-EIS-comments.doc
(undated).
141. 71 Fed. Reg. 39,422-39, 423 (2006); See also Tony Davis, New Grazing Rules Ride on Doc-
tored Science, 37 High Country News (July 25, 2005).
142. W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink et al., 2007 WL 1667618, 2 (Idaho Dist. 2007).
143. Id. at 2-3.
144. Id. at 2.
145. Ranchers' lobbyists, like the Public Lands Council, urged the Administration to appeal the
ruling, yet the Administration has not publically stated how it will proceed. See PLC, Letter to Secre-
tary of the Interior, http://www.thepubliclandscouncil.org/plc2/default.asp?piD=4087 (Aug. 10, 2007).
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from career scientists in the BLM and the FWS. Enviromnental interest
groups and other opponents successfully used the courts to block the Ad-
ministration.
C. Permit Retirement
The retirement of grazing permits by environmental groups is another
high profile public lands grazing issue that the Bush Administration has
addressed. These buyouts increase the role of market forces in allocating
resources among competing users of public lands, and decrease the role of
politics.146 The most prominent efforts have involved the Grand Canyon
Trust (Trust), which purchased grazing permits in the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument (GSENM) above the North Rim of the
Grand Canyon. In the late 1990s, the Trust began buying grazing permits
from willing ranchers and removing cattle from hundreds of thousands of
acres with little notice. 147 In 2001, the Trust spent over a million dollars on
several permits covering several hundred thousand acres in GSENM after
negotiating a retirement process with BLM officials. 148 The Trust offered to
relinquish the permits to the BLM. In response, the BLM prepared an En-
vironmental Assessment (EA) for each allotment to consider land use plan
amendments to retire grazing permits. 49  The Trust's Bill Hedden sought
146. David G. Alderson, Buyouts and Conservation Permits: A Market Approach to Address the
Federal Public Land Grazing Problem, 12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 903 (2005). The various proposals to
have the federal government "buyout" ranchers willing to sell their grazing permits in order to perma-
nently retire livestock grazing, which the Administration opposes, will not be examined in this paper.
See H.R. 3166, 109"h Cong. (2005); See also National Public Lands Grazing Campaign, Home Page,
http://www.publiclandsranching.org (March 25, 2008).
147. The process typically had the Trust purchase a permit from a rancher willing to sell and then
relinquish the permit to the BLM or USFS, which would then amend the land use plan to cancel grazing
as a use. See Alderson, supra n. 146; See also Steven C. Forrest, Creating New Opportunities for Eco-
system Restoration on Public Lands, 23 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 21 (2002); See also Toni
Thayer, Why You Can't Trust the Trust, Range Magazine, www.rangemagazine.comlarchives/
stories/winter03/dont-trust.htm (Winter 2000) (criticism of GCT, its Board of Directors, and major
funders); See also Toni Thayer, Cash Cows Don't Graze: The Peculiar Relationship of Grand Canyon
Trust and Wal-Mart, Range Magazine, www.propertyrightsresearch.org/2006/articlesO8/cash-cows-
don.htm (Fall 2005).
148. Canyonlands Grazing Corporation Post-Hearing Brief in Lefevre et al v. BLM, U.S. Department
of Interior Office of Hearings and Appeals, November 15, 2005 at 4. The GSENM staff, the BLM, and
GCT had apparently collaborated in this process in 1998 during the Clinton Administration. See The
Kane and Garfield County Commissions, UT: Kane and Garfield County Commissioners Challenge
BLM, Grand Canyon Trust, Sierra Times (Feb. 20, 2003), http://citizenreviewonline.orglfeb_2003/
utah.htm.
149. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a). The BLM manages allotments according to "land use plans" that
generally provide for certain levels of grazing. Land use plans can be amended through a formal process
that includes an EA to analyze the environmental consequences of proposed changes in land uses. The
process also requires public consultation and allows formal protests. The offer to relinquish a grazing
permit may "trigger" an EA and an amendment to the land use plan. The process that was worked out
between the Trust and BLM was to have the Trust buy a grazing permit from a willing seller at a mutu-
ally agreeable price, and then offer to "relinquish" the permit to the BLM. The BLM would conduct an
EA and then amend the land use plan to "retire" the grazing use and allocate the forage on the allotment
to "wildlife" or "conservation" uses. Canyonlands Grazing Corporation Post-Hearing Brief in LeFevre
et al v. BLM, U.S. Department of Interior Office of Hearings and Appeals, November 15, 2005 at 4. The
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assurance from congressman Chris Cannon that the retirement process was
appropriate. Cannon secured letters from Norton and Scarlett, who ex-
pressed their support for this "market-based solution" in which the market




The BLM issued final EAs in 2002, recommending that the allotments be
closed to grazing, and that forage be reallocated to protect wildlife and ri-
parian corridors. Two counties in Utah containing large allotments filed
protests alleging that the recommendations violated the TGA. After rejec-
tion of the protest by the BLM, the counties and several ranchers appealed
the decision to the DOI, arguing that the Trust was not qualified to hold the
permits because it was not in the livestock business and did not intend to
graze. In testimony during subsequent hearings, the former Public Lands
Chairman of the Utah Cattlemen's Association claimed that the suit was
encouraged by Clarke, who opposed the effort to cancel grazing despite the
support from Norton and Scarlett.152 One Kane County Commissioner said:
I think [the retirement agreement] seriously threaten[s] the
stability of the livestock industry in southern Utah, and
cumulatively, I think it threatens the livestock industry in
the West, which relies on public lands grazing .... If this
process of buyout, relinquishment and permanent closure
of the allotment to grazing - if that process can take hold,
it will sweep like wildfire through the grazing communi-
ties.
153
Several ranchers applied for retired permits. The Trust refused to relinquish
the permits until the DOI responded to the protests and the applications. In
the meantime, Myers issued an opinion that existing statutes allowed only
Congress to permanently exclude lands from grazing, and that allotments
found to be chiefly valuable for grazing remained subject to applications for
"retirement" would not be permanent because the BLM could complete another EA and land use plan
amendment at a later date.
150. See Julie Brugger, Contesting Neoliberal Governmentality in the New West: The Taylor Graz-
ing Act Reconsidered, paper presented at Liberalism, Governance, and the Geographies of Law, Univer-
sity of Washington Simpson Center for the Humanities, May 11-12, 2007 (detailed chronology of the
GSENM controversy).
151. See UT: Kane and Garfield County Commissioners Challenge BLM, Grand Canyon Trust,
supra n.148.
152. Id. The Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility asked the DOI Inspector General
to investigate whether Clarke's actions violated the law or conflict of interest regulations. Ltr. from Jeff
Ruch to Earl E. Devaney (Aug. 29, 2005) (available at http://www.peer.org/docs/blmO5-29-8-oig-
request.pdf).
153. Joe Bauman, Grazing Permit a Threat?, Deseret Morning News, http://deseretnews.com/dn/
print/I ,1442,635180424,00.html (Jan. 1, 2006).
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grazing permits.154 This opinion reversed the previous opinion issued under
the Clinton Administration. 
155
By 2003, after two years of reduced or suspended grazing in GSENM
due to drought, the BLM reauthorized grazing. The Trust purchased and
leased cattle to graze its allotments at minimal levels, and eventually pur-
chased two ranches. In early 2003, an administrative law judge rejected the
Utah counties' and ranchers' appeal regarding the Trust's permits. 156 The
ranchers and counties appealed the decision at several levels, and lost in
each instance. A federal court ultimately found that the counties acted
unlawfully by paying the ranchers' legal costs. 157 The BLM announced that
it would defer further action until it could complete an EIS addressing the
entire GSENM.5 8 This EIS has not yet been completed.
In this case, the Bush Administration prevailed in allowing environ-
mental groups to purchase grazing permits from willing sellers in order to
reduce or eliminate grazing despite opposition from a Director of the BLM
that Bush appointed. The Administration successfully defended its position
against ranchers, their associations, and local officials. President Bush
agreed with Clarke and most ranchers.
Uncertainty remains about the retirement process due to the incomplete
EIS, which could lead to a reduction or elimination of grazing. On the
other hand, it may support continued grazing, especially given the political
pressure on the BLM. Uncertainty also exists because the administrative
process cannot permanently end grazing on public lands. Rather, Congress
must act to cancel a grazing permit. The BLM reiterated this position in an
Instructional Memorandum issued in 2007: "receiving a grazing relin-
quishment of preference does not, in and of itself, result in the forage be-
coming unavailable for use by livestock. Reassigning the available forage
allocation for livestock grazing due to relinquishment supports the BLM's
multiple-use mission.' 59 The Memorandum also made clear that the BLM
was not bound by "any agreement or contract that involves third-party
compensation to a permittee or lessee for submitting a relinquishment to
154. Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Authority for the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment to Consider Requests for Retiring Grazing Permits and Leases on Public Lands M-37008 (Oct. 4,
2002). Myers had previously served as Executive Director for the National Cattlemen's Beef Associa-
tion and the Public Lands Council. Critics argue that Myers interpretation is a misreading of the laws.
See e.g. Alderson, supra n. 146, at 928.
155. Office of the Solicitor to BLM re: Authority for BLM to Act on Requests for Voluntary Re-
tirement of Livestock Grazing Permits on BLM-Managed Public Lands, pp. 1-4 (Jan. 19, 2001) (Subject
line of official memorandum written by John Leshy, Solicitor, Dept. of the Interior, to Director, BLM).
156. LeFevre, et al v. BLM, U.S. Department of Interior Office of Hearing and Appeals, Order, p. 37
(Jan. 26, 2006).
157. Grand Canyon Trust v. Kane Co., Case 060600098 (Sixth District Court Utah Dist. 2007).
158. BLM, Record of Decision and Finding of No Significant Impact For an Amendment to the
Paria and Escalante Management Framework Plans, p. 1 (Jan. 9, 2003).
159. BLM, Relinquishment of Grazing Preference on BLM Administered Lands, http://www.blm.
gov/nhp/efoialwo/fyO7/im2007-067.htm (Feb. 20, 2007).
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BLM."'16 This makes purchasers reluctant to relinquish a permit to BLM
since it could be reallocated for grazing. Holding the permit, however, re-
quires that they graze the allotment.'
6
'
Recent official pronouncements by Administration officials reaffirm their
support for maintaining grazing on public lands. In a 2007 speech to the
Public Lands Council, USFS Chief Gail Kimbell said:
[r]anching is not only part of the West, the culture of ranch-
ing is also part of the Forest Service.... I see four major
threats to the health and productivity of the lands we jointly
manage: fire and fuels, invasive species, loss of open space,
and unmanaged outdoor recreation. These are the true con-
cerns we should be focusing on in managing public lands..
not livestock grazing.
162
Former Deputy Director of the BLM Jim Hughes testified before Congress
that the Bush Administration recognized that sustainable use of rangelands
was "vital to the economic well-being and cultural identity of the West and
to rural Western communities." He said, "[w]e are working diligently to...
assure stability of ranching on public lands.' 163 Currently, the USFS openly
supports livestock grazing on National Forest System lands, stating, "that
livestock grazing on these lands, if responsibly done, provides a valuable
resource to the livestock owners as well as the American people."'
64
D. Sustaining Working Landscapes
The Bush Administration considered more significant grazing policy
changes that would have provided even more flexibility for managers than
allowed by the current statutory and regulatory regime. The BLM's "Sus-
taining Working Landscapes Initiative" sought new mechanisms to restore
and maintain rangeland health, including conservation partnerships, reserve
common allotments, and voluntary allotment restructuring, while simulta-
neously maintaining the economic viability of ranching operations.'
65
160. Id.
161. Opponents who fought the GCT relinquishment plan have taken some consolation in this.
Rancher and Utah State Representative Mike Noel said, "We turned them from environmentalists into
cowboys. I guess what they can do is get their cows and start losing money like the rest of us." Bauman,
supra n. 153.
162. Gail Kimbell, Speech, Partnerships for Working Ranches: Key to Rangeland Health (Public
Lands Council Spring Conference, Mar. 26, 2007) (transcr. available at http://www.fs.fed.us/news/2007/
speeches/03/rangeland.shtml).
163. Sen. Subcomm. Pub. Lands and Forests of Sen. Energy and Nat. Resources Comm., Public
Rangeland Management and Livestock Grazing on Public Lands, http:llwww.blm.govlnhp/newsllegis-
lative/pages/2005/te050928.htm (Sept. 28, 2005).
164. USFS, Why Does the Forest Service Permit Livestock Grazing on NFS Lands?,
http://www.fs.fed.us/rangelands/uses/allowgrazing.shtml (last accessed Mar. 12, 2007).
165. BLM, Home Page, http://www.blm.gov/co/st/en/BLMInformationlnewsrooml2003/blm_
grazing..policy.print.html (initiative described).
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Some of these mechanisms would have provided a bigger role for ranchers
in management decisions in accordance with Secretary Norton's preference
for conservation through consultation, communication, and cooperation.
Among the more extensive policy changes discussed under the Sustain-
ing Working Landscapes Initiative were "Conservation Partnerships,"
which would have allowed permittees to voluntarily and temporarily devote
an allotment to providing environmental services, such as riparian restora-
tion, enhanced water flow and quality, improved wildlife and fisheries habi-
tat, or endangered species recovery. The creation of "Reserve Common
Allotments" would have provided alternative grazing areas for permittees
while they devoted their customary allotment to rangeland recovery. "Vol-
untary Allotment Restructuring" would have allowed livestock operators to
develop partnerships with other operators, the BLM, or even non-grazing
groups in order to merge allotments and provide more forage while restor-
ing rangeland health. Conservation Easements would have allowed ranch-
ers to voluntarily accept restrictions on the use of their property and gain
grazing access to other BLM lands, thereby allowing more flexibly for
meeting conservation goals like preserving open space.166
The policy changes considered would have allowed more fluid and flexi-
ble management of grazing lands and allowed permittees to voluntarily
devote their allotments to non-grazing conservation use, with fewer top-
down mandates on grazing.1 67 However, these changes would not seriously
challenge this framework, as it sought to increase conservation without
disrupting grazing on public lands. Nonetheless, after years of deliberation,
the Administration decided not to pursue these changes.'
68
V. THE TRAILS NOT TAKEN
As a candidate George W. Bush advocated for a version of "cowboy
capitalism" that mistrusted government, rejected federal command-and-
control statutes, and argued that "government must replace antiquated laws
that restrict opportunity, increase costs, and inhibit innovation.' ' 69  As
President, however, Bush has not pursued grazing reform that reflects these
beliefs. In fact, the market- oriented PERC gave his Administration a C+
for its grazing policies, claiming, "in spite of promising rhetoric, the Bush
166. Id.
167. There have, in fact, been examples across the West of innovative and cooperative efforts to
integrate grazing and conservation on public and private lands. See Jake Page, Ranchers Form a 'Radi-
cal Center' to Protect Wide-Open Spaces, Smithsonian 50-60 (June 1997) (discussion of the Malpai
Borderlands Group).
168. The broader concept of "cooperative conservation" which would involve voluntary collabora-
tion between federal agencies, local governments, private property owners, and non-profit and for-profit
entities was reflected in the June 2007 legislative proposal by the DOI called the Cooperative Conserva-
tion Enhancement Act. It does not explicitly address the grazing reforms discussed above. Copy of the
Cooperative Conservation Enhancement Act available at http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/Cooperative
ConservationEnhancement%20Act.pdf.
169. Bush, supra n. 16.
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Administration has failed to open up grazing to a market approach."'' 70
Various scholars, think tanks, and politicians have proposed other market-
oriented grazing refonns, ignored by the Bush Administration, which de-
serve a brief overview.
Free-market advocates have long argued that most bureaucratic man-
agement of grazing, combined with the insecurity of grazing rights, leads to
a misallocation of forage resources. In 1962, Gardner wrote that agency
allocations and other "non-price rationing criteria" prevent resources from
serving highest potential economic use, and impede economic development
by "diminishing the product that might have been taken from the re-
source."1 71  Nelson argues that "the lack of any clear rights on federal
rangelands has resulted in blurred lines of responsibility[,] which have been
as harmful to the environment as they have been to the conduct of the live-
stock business."1 72 Since no market option exists for registering the de-
mand for alternative land uses, it is funneled into the political system,
where the relative strength of special interest groups influence land use
decisions. As a result, resources do not necessarily flow to the highest val-
ued use. Meanwhile, the possibility that political pressure may cause a
grazing permit to be reallocated to another use depresses the value of the
permit and the property. 173 Ranchers, having no long-term security in their
own grazing rights, are thereby given an incentive to make short-term deci-
sions as resource users and land managers.
A more common market-oriented policy reform proposal is to create for-
age rights that can be bought and sold in the market. Hess and Wald argue:
Congress should bust the cowboy trust on federal lands. All
Americans should be free to acquire permits to federal
grass and to use the lands to enhance wildlife, stabilize
soils, protect endangered species, improve riparian areas or,
if they prefer, raise red meat. 74
Forage rights could be re-defined in a variety of ways. The PERC pro-
poses that the government sell the rights to the current permit holder at a
price that incorporates the future value of the grazing fee. 175 Once forage
170. Bruce Randle & Jane S. Shaw, eds., PERC Report Card Environmental and Natural Resource
Policies Bush Administration 2003-2004: Executive Summary iii, http://www.perc.org/pdf/reportcard
_2004/00exsummary.pdf (October 28, 2004).
17 1. B. Delworth Gardner, Transfer Restrictions and Misallocation in Grazing Public Range, 44 J.
of Farm Econ. 33 (1962).
172. Robert H. Nelson, How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on Federal Range-
lands, 8 Fordham Env. Law J. 649 (1997).
173. Lorraine M. Egan & Myles J. Watts, Some Costs of Incomplete Property Rights with Regard to
Federal Grazing Permits, 74 Land Econ. 171-186 (1998).
174. Karl Hess, Jr. & Johanna H. Wald, Grazing Reform: Here's the Answer, High Country News
(Oct. 2, 1995). http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?articleid= 1370.
175. Donald R. Leal, ed., Conservative Conservation: Policy Proposals for a New Century 16-17,
http://www.perc.orglpdf/conservation.pdf (1995); See also John A. Baden, A Modest Idea to Create
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rights are established, the "use it or lose it" grazing requirement would be
eliminated, so that the permit holder could determine the use of the land
within certain constraints. The base property ownership requirement might
also be eliminated so that ranchers or other users not adjacent to the allot-
ment could still compete for the permit. The requirement that the permit
holder be in the livestock business could also be eliminated so that envi-
ronmental and recreation groups could acquire forage rights. Eliminating
subleasing restrictions would offer more flexible use of the allotment to
take advantage of the diversity and quality of the resources. 176 These
changes would move government policy away from mandated livestock
grazing, and allow the market to determine the "proper use" of the public
lands. 77  Better land management practices will follow "secure, well-
defined, and transferable property rights for those who use the public range,
be they a private ranch or the Nature Conservancy Trust."'178 However, the
Bush Administration has chosen not to pursue these policy changes.
"[I]nstead of promoting a market approach to the grazing issue, the Bush
Administration has chosen to make only marginal changes in regula-
19179tions.
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Keeping Public Lands Off the Agenda
In the confrontation between the President's cowboy capitalism and the
welfare ranching status quo, cowboy capitalism seems to have withered.
Despite his ideology, Bush did not prioritize or even address market-
oriented grazing reform. Since public lands grazing occurs only in eleven
western states, general public interest in the issue remains low. In 1975,
two authors described "Lands No One Knows," arguing that the public was
uninformed and uninterested in public land. 180 Since then, demographic
trends in the west, like population growth, have created more interest and
conflict over public lands, making them once again contested plains. In-
Balance in Range Reform, Seattle Times (Nov. 17, 1993) at http://www.freeeco.org/articleDisplay.
php?id=328.
176. Nelson, supra n. 172, at 672 (proposals summarized); See also Alderson, supra n. 146; Forrest,
supra n. 147; Teny A. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmentalism (rev. ed., Palgrave
McMillian 2001); Jerry L. Holechek & Karl Hess, "Free Market Policy for Public Land Grazing,"
Rangelands, April 1994, pp. 63-67.
177. Nelson, supra n. 172.
178. Baden, supra n. 175.
179. Terry A. Anderson, Grazing on Public Lands, in Randle & Shaw, supra n. 170, at 58. Ironi-
cally, the Clinton Administration's 1997 Economic Report of the President argued for "increasing the
transferability" of forage rights so that non-ranching interests could compete to acquire grazing permits:
"Users of Federal public lands should be more exposed to market signals, so that their decisions will
help maximize economic welfare for all." 1997 Economic Report of the President 223-224,
http:l/www.umsl.edulserviceslgovdocslerp/1997/chap6.pdf (1997).
180. T. H. Watkins & Charles S. Watson, Jr., The Lands No One Knows: America and the Public
Domain (Sierra Club Books 1975).
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creasing urbanization has created demands for recreation and other non-
forage uses.'81 Survey research indicates a general public preference, even
in grazing states, to shift rangeland management away from a livestock
grazing emphasis and toward protection of "nonmarket" resources. Local
residents of specific rangeland regions, however, are more supportive of
livestock grazing, which they see as a tradition and way of life that ought to
be protected. 182 Public land issues are seldom mentioned because they af-
fect such a narrow segment of the public. 83 Although the public is gener-
ally supportive of shifting land uses away from ranching, the issue is not a
public priority. President Bush faced little public pressure to include graz-
ing reform on his policy agenda, and the desire to avoid escalating the con-
troversy in Republican-leaning states undercut any incentive to act aggres-
sively.
B. Special Interest Politics
Apart from public opinion, special interest groups are a political force to
which the President responds. The power of Bush's market-oriented graz-
ing constituency to apply political pressure, create incentives, or provide
rewards or punishment is limited. Ranching advocates working on behalf of
special interests, however, have long had hefty political clout. Most of
these lobbyists are from states that serve as Republican strongholds in the
presidental election. In 2000, Bush lost the national popular vote, but car-
ried seven out of eleven public lands grazing states.184 Ranching lobbyists,
like the NCBA, are important political players.
According to its press releases, the NCBA is "the largest organization
representing America's cattle industry," and the industry leader in "influ-
encing public policy to improve producer profitability and in preserving the
181. Larry W. Van Tassell, L. Allen Torell, & Neil R. Rimbey, Grazing on Public Lands in the 21"
Century, New Mexico State University Research Report 737 (2001); See also Jerry L. Holechek,
Western Ranching at the Crossroads, 23 Rangelands 17 (2001).
182. Mark W. Brunson & Brent S. Steel, Sources of Variation in Attitudes and Beliefs About Fed-
eral Rangeland Management, 49 J. of Rangeland Mgt. 69 (1996); Mark W. Brunson & Brent S. Steel,
National Public Attitudes Toward Federal Rangeland Management, 16 Rangelands 2, pp. 77-81 (1994);
Livestock Grazing on Public Lands, 7 Q. Profile of New Mexico Citizens: A U. of N.M. Inst. for Pub.
Policy Survey Research Center Rep. 3 (1995); Range Reform in New Mexico, 6 Q. Profile of New
Mexico Citizens: A U. of N.M. Inst. for Pub. Policy Survey Research Center Rep. I (1994); James A.
DeLoney, Nevada's 2003 Statewide Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan-Assessment and Policy
Plan Ch. 4, http:llwww.parks.nv.gov/Scorp/Chapter%204%2OPublic%200pinion%20on%2OPublic%20
Land%20Mgt.pdf (Mar. 2004).
183. Pew Research Center, Issues and Continuity Now Working for Gore, http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=-33 (Sept. 14, 2000); Pew Research Center, Economy Now
Seen Through Partisan Prism: Emerging Priorities for '06 Energy, Crime and Environment,
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=-268 (Jan. 24, 2006); Joseph Carroll, Environ-
ment Not Highest-Priority Issue This Election Year, The Gallup Poll, http://www.gallup.com/Poll/
Releases/pr000925.asp (Sept. 25, 2000).
184. Bush lost the Democratic-leaning and more urbanized Pacific coast states of California, Ore-
gon, and Washington, along with New Mexico.
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industry's heritage and future., 185 However, the NCBA blurs the line be-
tween public and private land, arguing that "public lands have become part
of the economic base and cultural heritage of western communities. 186 The
NCBA describes ranching on public land as a "positive partnership between
federal agencies and western livestock operators," and claims that "ranchers
serve as public land managers, helping government agencies cut costs and
meet resource objectives.', 187  The NCBA is dedicated to maintaining the
integration of public lands with private ranches: "[w]e want producers to
know we are finding ways to make it easier and more economically viable
for livestock producers to operate their ranches with federal lands as part of
their forage base."'
' 88
Part of the NCBA's effort to protect the profitability of ranching on pub-
lic lands has been to contribute hundreds of thousands of dollars to Repub-
lican and Democratic election campaigns in western states. The group has
spent comparable sums lobbying Congress, the White House, and the agen-
cies.1 89 The NCBA claimed a political ally in President Bush. In 2004, it
supported his re-election, formally endorsing a presidential candidate for
the first time in its 106 year history. It claimed this was necessary because
"the policies of President Bush and those of his Administration most
closely match the policies of the NCBA. ... President Bush will continue
to protect the rights of grazing permittees."' 90 After his re-election, the
NCBA lobbied hard for the BLM to change the grazing rule: "[w]e are
grateful to the Bush Administration for taking a step toward a regulatory
system that will better enhance the business climate for our nation's public
lands ranchers."' 9' President Bush and members of his administration have
spoken at a number of NCBA annual conferences.
192
185. The language is standard in National Cattlemen's Beef Association press releases, at
http://www.beefusa.org/theanationalcattlemen-sassociation.aspx (last accessed April 31, 2008).
186. National Cattlemen's Beef Association, Grazing Programs, http://www.beefusa.org/gove
GrazingPrograms.aspx (last accessed April 31, 2008)
187. Id.
188. NCBA, Public Lands Council Asks Grazing Permit Holders Nationwide: Support Aggressive
Efforts to Preserve Our Livelihood, http://www.beefusa.org/NEWSPublicLandsCouncilSupportEfforts
toPreserveOurLivelihood-6150522348.aspx (June 16, 2005).
189. The Center for Responsive Politics data base includes NCBA contributions to federal candi-
dates and parties (76 percent to Republicans), as well as lobbying expenditures ($131,330 as of March
31, 2008). See http://www.opensecrets.org./pacs/lookup2.asp?strlD=C0028787&cycle=2008.
190. NCBA, NCBA Policy Division Says Bush is the One, http://www.beefusa.org/NEWSNCBA
PolicyDivisionSaysBushistheOne3486.aspx (Aug. 13, 2004).
191. NCBA, Public Lands Ranchers Applaud BLM's Efforts to Strengthen Grazing, http://www.
beefusa.org/NEWSRanchersApplaudBLMsEffortstoStrengthenGrazing-6170522356.aspx (June 17,
2005). The NCBA issued a lengthy criticism of the Idaho District Court's decision enjoining the regula-
tions. See Jeff Eisenberg, Memo. to PLC and NCBA, http://thewestemer.blogspot.coml 2007/06/june-
21-2007-memorandum-from-jeff.html (June 21, 2007).
192. President Bush Speaks at NCBA Conference, Farm Futures: Political Daily at http://www.
politicaldaily.org/link.asp?ID=1 82925&Title=President%2OBush%2OSpeaks%20at%20NCBA%20Con-
ference (March 28, 2007).
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Livestock associations like the NCBA have cultivated congressional al-
lies in western states. Many of these legislators hold important leadership
and committee positions, including New Mexico Republican Senator Pete
Domenici, the ranking member and former chair of the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee that helped scuttle grazing reforms pushed
by the Clinton Administration. These alliances reflect long-standing rela-
tionships between members of Congress and ranching interests. According
to Layzer, "[b]y the early 1970s[,] ranchers' congressional allies had
achieved firm control over the public lands authorizing and appropriating
subcommittees in both chambers." '1 93 Bush was not interested in challeng-
ing or alienating these ranchers and their congressional allies as he pursued
other policy reforms that required support from western congressional dele-
gations.
Environmental organizations are usually special interest groups that seek
to drastically curtail or eliminate grazing on public lands. These groups are
not typically part of the Republican base, and have achieved mixed results
by opposing the new policies. According to the Sierra Club, almost all
commercial grazing is "not appropriate on federal public lands."1 94 The
Center for Biological Diversity ("CBD") claims that "grazing is an expen-
sive and wasteful use of our spectacular public lands .... [E]iminating
livestock grazing on public lands would make an enormous difference in
the recovery of imperiled species, in water and watershed quality, [and] in
the abundance of wildlife."'9 5 The CBD argued that the new Bush grazing
regulations would "allow the fox to guard the henhouse," and leave other
interested parties "without recourse as soils, water, vegetation and imper-
iled species suffer from the exploitation of our public lands."' 96 The Forest
Guardians also criticized the regulatory proposals: "[t]he push by the Bush
administration for new handouts to the livestock industry threatens clear
water and public land that should be available to feed and house declining
wildlife populations."'' 97 The National Wildlife Federation asserted, "the
proposed rules are especially damaging because they will disenfranchise
193. Judith Layzer, Federal Grazing Policy: Some Things Never Change, The Environmental Case:
Translating Values Into Policy 184 (2nd ed., CQ Press 2006); See also Klyza, supra n. 47 (on this
relationship); See Gerald A. Fennemore & Jon P. Nelson, Western Rangelands Reform: An Analysis of
the 1996 Senate Vote on Federal Grazing Fees, 19 Contemporary Econ. Policy 322 (2001) (analysis of
the influence of ranching interests on Senators' votes).
194. Sierra Club, Federal Public Lands Grazing Policy,
http:llwww.sierraclub.orglpolicy/conservation/grazing.asp (Sept. 24, 2000).
195. Center for Biological Diversity, Press Release, GAO Finds Public Lands Grazing in the Red:
Budget Deficit at Least $123 Million Annually, http://biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/press/grazingl0-31-
05.html (Oct. 31, 2005).
196. Center for Biological Diversity, Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Land Mangement's New Regula-
tions Undercut Public Participation and Threaten Wildlife and Water With hand-Outs to the Livestock
Industry, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/press/grazing6-16-05.html (June 16, 2005).
197. Forest Guardians, Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Land Mangement's New Regulations Under-
cut Public Participation and Threaten Wildlife and Water With hand-Outs to the Livestock Industry,
http://www.fguardians.orgllibrary/paper.asp?nMode= I &nLibrarylD=46 (June 16, 2005).
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the public, and further entrench destructive livestock grazing on BLM
lands."198
The environmental groups have influenced some western legislators, and
federal agencies, but they are not part of the Republican constituency and
have been active opponents of Bush Administration. As a result, they have
not been able to change the status quo.
C. The Bureaucratic Status Quo
President Bush has echoed long standing justifications offered in defense
of the bureaucratic status quo, including claims that subsidies and regula-
tions protect a traditional western way of life, support rural economies, and
check suburban sprawl by protecting open space. The Administration's
adoption of traditional arguments reflects unwillingness to challenge the
status quo. A new administration inherits a regulatory regime and a bu-
reaucracy with an investment in existing arrangements. The bureaucrats
often have close relationships with the interests they regulate and the con-
gressional committees that authorize and fund their programs. 99 Because
the status quo is written into the bureaucratic culture and practiced by pro-
fessionals in government, industry, and academia, changing it is difficult.2°°
"Agencies and their personnel inevitably have narrower perspectives than
the White House and will desire to maintain and expand their programs,
status, and influence. Those ambitions often bias the options and informa-
tion presented to the White House."' 2°
When the BLM initially announced the proposed rule changes, Director
Clarke reiterated the agency's commitment to grazing on public lands, rec-
ognizing "the economic contributions and social value of ranching., 20 2 The
USFS has expressed a similar view: "[m]any rural communities continue to
be dependent upon ranching for their economic livelihood and most of
these ranches rely on federal land grazing .... It is the goal [of the USFS]
to conserve the rich resources of the National Forests and Grasslands while
supporting communities greatly dependent upon these very same re-
sources.' 2°3 Secretary Norton also came to represent the most conservative
elements in the DOI. Regarding proposed regulatory changes, she said:
198. National Wildlife Federation, New Grazing Rules Threaten Wildlife and Habitat on America's
Public Lands, http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/GrazingRules.pdf (Last accessed April 31, 2008).
199. Burdett A. Loomis and Allan J. Cigler, "The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics,"
Interest Group Politics, pp. 1-32 (5"h ed., 1998).
200. John Tiemey and William Frasure, "Culture Wars on the Frontier: Interests, Values, and Policy
Narratives in Public Lands Policies," Interest Group Politics, pp. 303-326 (5th ed. 1998).
201. George C. Edwards II & Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policymak-
ing 246 (5th ed., Wadsworth Publg. 1999).
202. BLM, Interior Secretary Announces Proposed Grazing Rule That Would Improve Grazing
Management, Help Continue Public Lands Ranching, http:llwww.blm.gov/nhp/newslreleases/pagesl
2003/pr031205_grazing.htm (Dec. 5, 2003).
203. USFS, Why Does the Forest Service Permit Livestock Grazing on NFS Lands?, http://www.
fs.fed.us/rangelands/uses/allowgrazing.shtml (Mar. 12, 2007).
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"We all know there are people out there who want to end public grazing.
President Bush is not one of them, and I am not one of them. This admini-
stration is going to do everything possible to ensure that public lands'




Reiterating the traditional rationale for grazing on public lands may re-
flect a sincere commitment to public lands ranching, or a response to tradi-
tional bureaucratic politics. The Administration's statements supporting
public lands grazing on traditional grounds reflect a sincere commitment to
industry, yet conflict with the free-market rhetoric. The Administration's
willingness to support the status quo and sacrifice its ideology to the tradi-
tional arrangements may reflect a practical political calculation.
D. The Statutory Status Quo
Presidents inherit a statutory framework that limits their ability to change
policy. As Charles Jones argues, "presidents enter a government already at
work., 20 5 However, existing statutes do provide some latitude, and Bush
could have pushed harder within the existing statutory framework to allow
market forces to play a bigger role in public land use decisions. Bush may
have chosen not to risk an open debate on ranching policy given the politi-
cal climate during his Presidency. An affinity or sympathy for the ranching
industry possibly carried more weight with Bush than his free enterprise
ideology.
VII. CONCLUSION
President Bush entered office having expressed an ideological view criti-
cal of government planning and regulation and supportive of free markets
called "cowboy capitalism." He inherited a public lands grazing policy that
valued grazing above other uses by permitting private livestock operators to
use public land under certain conditions and regulations. This policy estab-
lished a status quo that was rationalized by decision makers to protect and
subsidize an industry with deep roots in western rural communities. It was
characterized by critics as "welfare ranching."
Although President Bush's record was mixed, politics trumped ideology,
and he generally favored welfare ranching over cowboy capitalism. In its
early years, his Administration appeared willing to challenge the traditional
command-and-control system of mandating specific land uses by allowing
ranchers to voluntarily sell grazing permits to non-grazing users. In the
end, however, the Administration insisted that allotments must be grazed,
204. Gale Norton, Speech, Remarks prepared for Delivery to the 856 Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation, (Jan. 11, 2004) (transcr. available at http://www.doi.gov/news/
04011 Ihawaii).
205. Charles 0. Jones, Separate But Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency 78 (Chatham
House Publishers 1995).
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and traditional grazing policies prevailed. Accordingly, the Bush Admini-
stration's regulatory reform efforts merely aimed to ease the regulatory
burden on ranchers, not subject the industry to market-oriented land use
reform. The Administration did consider statutory reforms of grazing poli-
cies, but the fact that these statutory reforms were not especially bold and
did not become legislative proposals reveals that the Administration had
other priorities. Even if they had gone forward, these reforms would not
have reflected market-determined priorities. For the moment, efforts to
reform grazing policies have now been largely abandoned.
